About Same Sex Marriage: A Reply to Objections

A philosopher friend of mine recently sent me a series of objections and questions about my recent article about the issue of same sex marriage. In this piece of writing, I will respond to them as fairly as I can. For a short summary, see the numbered points at the end of the paper.

I have said this once, and I will say it again: I do NOT defend bullying, violence and such unjust discrimination against people with same sex attractions. No matter what ones attractions, one is a human being, worthy of respect.

 But I do defend the thesis that it is not unjust to exclude those with same sex attractions from marriage. As I argued for in the original essay, marriage serves a vital purpose of protecting and supporting the unique relationship between a man and a woman that can bring forth the next generation. Marriage serves the purpose of ensuring, as much as possible, children grow up with both their mother and father. Same sex relationships are not the same as opposite sex relationships in this crucial respect, so it is dishonest to treat them as exactly the same. There are many ways to love - not all love is married love.  In this essay, I will respond to the further objections.

First, my friend points out to me that "Marriage is a social, legal arrangement, not biological." I suppose that implies that if something is simply a social and legal arrangement one can justifiably change it if one wants to. It is true that it is possible to change a legal and social arrangement. But that does not mean it is a good idea.

In response to the claim that marriage is a social, legal arrangement, I reply yes, in an important sense that is correct. However, the deeper issue is why social institutions are created in the first place. Social institutions are not normally created arbitrarily, rather, ideally in the service of the common good. What I have been trying to point out is that marriage exists in the service of the common good - to ensure as far as possible, that children are raised by their natural parents, the people that should be responsible for them, being the ones that gave them life. There is a reason why such relationships are enshrined in such a manner as marriage - they are in the service of the common good. We do not enshrine friendships in such a manner because they do not have such a crucial relevance to the common good. Meanwhile, the welfare of the family, the natural family to be precise, is very much the concern of the state, if we understand the purpose of the state being to uphold the common good. Stable families create happy, virtuous people, vital given democracy requires the personal responsibility of its citizens.

In my previous essay, when I was talking about the family, I was specifically referring to the natural family - cases of adoption are making the best of a less than ideal situation. It may be charged that I am committing the naturalistic fallacy of deriving an ought from an is. I argue this is not the case. To be sure, the way things are does not automatically imply that they are the way things should be. It takes reflection on how the way things are affects human flourishing to discern whether or not something ought to be. My thesis is that family structure is important for human flourishing - children in fact do need a mother and a father. Mum is not optional. Dad is not optional. I strongly caution against this rash denial of human nature.

I talk about the distinction between possible in  principle vs. possible in  practice. My interlocutor objects, suggesting that I am Platonicising the relationships - that there is some universal in the "realm of forms". Not so. I am a realist - my metaphysics is that there are real universals. Humanity, family, redness are not just simply labels that one can just arbitrarily invent and change. The mind must conform with reality - reality is not ultimately created by the mind and will. However, I am not a hyper realist. Instead, my position is that universals are present in the particular things. I will, in time, write a defence of this realism.

Just to apply this abstract metaphysics, to illustrate the distinction between infertile opposite sex couples and same sex couples, I use the everyday idea of cars. The mind can grasp the universal of "car". There does not have to be a Platonic form of car. Infertile couples are like a broken car - broken or not, the car remains a car. Its essence still remains. Same sex relationships are different in kind - they can never be fertile, and so be the base for the natural family. In this way, they are like bikes. They are similar to cars, just like how same sex and opposite sex relationships are similar to each other in terms of love and affection.  But they are different in kind. So it is a mistake to call them exactly the same and treat them as such.

My friend also charges me with contradicting myself by me claiming simultaneously that same sex attracted people are just as able to love as opposite sex people, and also that it is unjust for a child to be deliberately denied a mother and a father. He asks "Where does the injustice stem if both parental combinations are equally capable?

I reply that there is no contradiction. First,  is perfectly possible for a person to do the things a good parent should do, but at the same time there being something ontologically not ideal with the structure of the family. The injustice, as I will reiterate, is the denial of a child his or her right to a mother and a father. Mum and dad are both important for a child's development. Men and women are different. Equal in dignity, I cannot emphasise that point enough. But different, differences important for a child to develop optimally.

Second, and even more fundamentally, the injustice is that a child is deliberately denied their heritage in being denied at least one of their natural parents. I object to the institutionalisation of such a thing, trying to claim that the not ideal is somehow equivalent to the ideal. In sum, family structure is just as important as love: children ideally need a mother and a father, their natural parents. I do not have the space to argue this point fully, Instead, I intend to write a much longer paper defending this claim. To be brief, the injustice is the denial of a child at least one of his or her natural parents, and in general, a mother and a father. No amount of love and affection justifies this being done deliberately.

In summary:

1) Marriage is a social institution and legal contract. However, I point out there is a reason why it exists, like any social institution - the ensuring a child is raised by his or her natural parents. It benefits the common good in a way that friendships and same sex relationships do not.

2) When I talked about family in my previous essay, I was referring to the natural family. Yes, an is does not automatically imply an ought. But I think it reasonable to believe that children need their mothers and fathers - mothers and fathers are not interchangeable.

3) To say that procreation in infertile heterosexual couples is possible in principle but not in practice is not to Platonicise the relationships. There are no "forms". But there are universals, just within the particulars. Damage to a thing does not change its essential nature, in the same way that a bird with its wings cut off is still a bird. It is not in the nature of same sex relationships to be able to bring forth the natural family. Meanwhile, between a man and a woman, this is in the nature of the relationship. To call something of an entirely different nature the same as the thing - be it birds, cars, relationships is a mistake.

4) The injustice when it comes to same sex marriage is not to do with parenting ability. Rather, it is the institutionalising of the deliberate denial of a child his natural parents, a mother and a father. Mothers and fathers are not optional, they have something unique to offer a child. Denying a child his or her heritage is the injustice.