Short Words on Love, Virtue and Vice.

The real mark of human excellence is love - the willing the good of the other as other, and then doing something about it. The more we love, the more beautiful our souls become, and we become good in any situation, no matter what the conditions. Love is an act of the will, not of the feelings. Feelings of love are good, but they are not always around. Hence, it is possible to love ones enemies. Aristotle was right when he said that human excellence is created by developing the virtues. Given that real human excellence is love, then the virtues can be said to be particular modes of love. Each virtue can be said to be a colour, all the colours of the rainbow subsumed into white light.

When we fail to love, we slowly lose that which makes us beautiful. As we do evil more and more, it is easy to become blinded by vice. Sometimes the only way to be woken up is by facing the painful consequences of selfishness. Suffering shakes us out of the transformation from human to monster if we let it. Boethius in the "Consolations of Philosophy" was quite right when he said that vice turns man into an animal, and that it is a tragedy when the evil prosper. For when the evil prosper, it becomes easier for them to delude themselves into thinking they are perfectly fine, when in reality they are spiritually dying or dead.

On Truth, Lies, and the Culture of Lies

Truth - what is, and saying it like it is. When we speak the truth, we are aligned with reality. When we live in truth, we live in wise accordance with the way things really are. If reality is such that drinking poison causes death, then we speak the truth when we say this... And living in accordance with the truth means not drinking poison, and warning people when they are about to drink poison! "What is Truth?", Pilate said to Jesus. Truth is as simple as that.

Some philosophers have argued that truth is ultimately what coheres with everything else we know. There is an element of truth in this... At least, it tells us something about the intuitions of our hearts. We sense that when all is said and done, the universe is intelligible, everything fits together in a beautiful mosaic.

But, I think it mistaken to reduce truth to coherence. The reason why I say this is that coherence and intelligibility derives from minds capable of grasping it. Such things are not universal. A certain mathematical fact or theorem may seem incoherent and unintelligible to a novice. But that does not make it untrue. The intelligibility of the theorem, and its coherence in the rest of the matrix of theorems can only be seen by someone with more experience - an expert mathematician. In this way, coherence is not the criterion of truth.

I also argue against coherence as being the criterion of truth, given that a fact can be perfectly coherent with other facts taken to be true, but still be mistaken. Geocentricism made perfect sense to people in the middle ages, given what they could see and understand of science at the time. The proposition was coherent. But that does not mean it was therefore true. Hence, coherence is not the criterion of truth. We expect coherence, but we cannot always get it. So, coherence cannot be the ultimate guide to truth. Someone who refuses to accept a claim, well backed up with evidence, because it does not cohere with his or her web of beliefs is either delusional, proud or both.


Truth, as I have pointed out, is correspondence of thought/word with reality.... Saying things as they really are. I observe though, that there is a culture of skepticism about truth.  Especially among junior philosophy students, this whole idea of "true for you, true for me" is very common. This is the dictatorship of relativism that Pope Benedict XVI spoke of. I propose a series of interrelated causes behind this state of affairs.

First, we have the phenomenon of existentialist philosophy. This was started by Friedrich Nietzsche, who in a nutshell, taught that we create reality, morality etc as artists, that life is, in a sense, art, a meaningless blank page to be scribbled on or finely painted, whatever we wish. This was carried forth by such thinkers as Jean-Paul Sartre, who argued that there is no human nature, "existence precedes essence", that there is no meaning in life except the meaning we give it. The theory of this school of thought may not be known explicitly by many people today. However, I see it in how people live their lives, interested in self-fulfillment, making their own lives, their own rules. We have become lost in radical individualism.

The existentialist philosophy, entailing radical individualism and subjectivism I observe is further played out in socio-economic changes of the 20th/21st century. Urban sprawl means we are losing the old sense of community and relationships with other people... Family sizes have dramatically shrunk , especially since the advent of the pill. It has become easier to fall into the delusion that we are islands, that we are radically free, not responsible to anybody... Shielded from the consequences of our actions, with unprecedented capability for comfort and pleasure, we live in grim cocoons. Contemporary society can be very poisonous.

I have highlighted the individualist/loneliness factor in creating the relativist culture I see. But there is another factor that is also important. As WWII drew to a fiery close with the atomic bomb, the whole confidence in human reason to create a better world was also smashed to pieces... So came the development of post modernist philosophy, skeptical of any claims to certainty, to the extent of arguing that truth itself is subjective. Reason turned against us.... So philosophically, in the academy, we have turned our backs on reason to embrace post modernism, where we see reality as only subjective opinions, all socially constructed.

Another factor in the cocoon that traps people in the matrix of relativism is how it has become easier to live in fantasy than ever before. With the advent of the computer, virtual worlds, facebook and the like, we can create our image to our hearts content, quite possibly lying to ourselves and the world until all lines between truth and lies are gone... So we deny truth itself. In a world filled with liars, truth itself becomes questionable.

When we live in a world of comfort, a world of tremendous technological power, it becomes easy to believe that our actions have no consequences, that we are God, able to create reality unconditionally. No consequences means we start to think like the Roman Emperors, or even worse, to think we are Gods. Meanwhile, the consequences of our errors show us clearly that reality does not bend to the human will - the human will must bend to reality to discover peace. A person who feels the pain of getting burnt will avoid putting his hand in a fire. A person who cannot just conveniently avoid the consequences of treating girls like mere objects to be lusted over will, hopefully, learn to have honour... Trouble is, with our increased ability to avoid the consequences of our actions, we have lost both the ability to learn, and the willingness to learn... We have the perfect society to breed unhealthy pride. The cocoon is doing its job, growing a monster. This pride will be our undoing.

About Same Sex Marriage: A Reply to Objections

A philosopher friend of mine recently sent me a series of objections and questions about my recent article about the issue of same sex marriage. In this piece of writing, I will respond to them as fairly as I can. For a short summary, see the numbered points at the end of the paper.

I have said this once, and I will say it again: I do NOT defend bullying, violence and such unjust discrimination against people with same sex attractions. No matter what ones attractions, one is a human being, worthy of respect.

 But I do defend the thesis that it is not unjust to exclude those with same sex attractions from marriage. As I argued for in the original essay, marriage serves a vital purpose of protecting and supporting the unique relationship between a man and a woman that can bring forth the next generation. Marriage serves the purpose of ensuring, as much as possible, children grow up with both their mother and father. Same sex relationships are not the same as opposite sex relationships in this crucial respect, so it is dishonest to treat them as exactly the same. There are many ways to love - not all love is married love.  In this essay, I will respond to the further objections.

First, my friend points out to me that "Marriage is a social, legal arrangement, not biological." I suppose that implies that if something is simply a social and legal arrangement one can justifiably change it if one wants to. It is true that it is possible to change a legal and social arrangement. But that does not mean it is a good idea.

In response to the claim that marriage is a social, legal arrangement, I reply yes, in an important sense that is correct. However, the deeper issue is why social institutions are created in the first place. Social institutions are not normally created arbitrarily, rather, ideally in the service of the common good. What I have been trying to point out is that marriage exists in the service of the common good - to ensure as far as possible, that children are raised by their natural parents, the people that should be responsible for them, being the ones that gave them life. There is a reason why such relationships are enshrined in such a manner as marriage - they are in the service of the common good. We do not enshrine friendships in such a manner because they do not have such a crucial relevance to the common good. Meanwhile, the welfare of the family, the natural family to be precise, is very much the concern of the state, if we understand the purpose of the state being to uphold the common good. Stable families create happy, virtuous people, vital given democracy requires the personal responsibility of its citizens.

In my previous essay, when I was talking about the family, I was specifically referring to the natural family - cases of adoption are making the best of a less than ideal situation. It may be charged that I am committing the naturalistic fallacy of deriving an ought from an is. I argue this is not the case. To be sure, the way things are does not automatically imply that they are the way things should be. It takes reflection on how the way things are affects human flourishing to discern whether or not something ought to be. My thesis is that family structure is important for human flourishing - children in fact do need a mother and a father. Mum is not optional. Dad is not optional. I strongly caution against this rash denial of human nature.

I talk about the distinction between possible in  principle vs. possible in  practice. My interlocutor objects, suggesting that I am Platonicising the relationships - that there is some universal in the "realm of forms". Not so. I am a realist - my metaphysics is that there are real universals. Humanity, family, redness are not just simply labels that one can just arbitrarily invent and change. The mind must conform with reality - reality is not ultimately created by the mind and will. However, I am not a hyper realist. Instead, my position is that universals are present in the particular things. I will, in time, write a defence of this realism.

Just to apply this abstract metaphysics, to illustrate the distinction between infertile opposite sex couples and same sex couples, I use the everyday idea of cars. The mind can grasp the universal of "car". There does not have to be a Platonic form of car. Infertile couples are like a broken car - broken or not, the car remains a car. Its essence still remains. Same sex relationships are different in kind - they can never be fertile, and so be the base for the natural family. In this way, they are like bikes. They are similar to cars, just like how same sex and opposite sex relationships are similar to each other in terms of love and affection.  But they are different in kind. So it is a mistake to call them exactly the same and treat them as such.

My friend also charges me with contradicting myself by me claiming simultaneously that same sex attracted people are just as able to love as opposite sex people, and also that it is unjust for a child to be deliberately denied a mother and a father. He asks "Where does the injustice stem if both parental combinations are equally capable?

I reply that there is no contradiction. First,  is perfectly possible for a person to do the things a good parent should do, but at the same time there being something ontologically not ideal with the structure of the family. The injustice, as I will reiterate, is the denial of a child his or her right to a mother and a father. Mum and dad are both important for a child's development. Men and women are different. Equal in dignity, I cannot emphasise that point enough. But different, differences important for a child to develop optimally.

Second, and even more fundamentally, the injustice is that a child is deliberately denied their heritage in being denied at least one of their natural parents. I object to the institutionalisation of such a thing, trying to claim that the not ideal is somehow equivalent to the ideal. In sum, family structure is just as important as love: children ideally need a mother and a father, their natural parents. I do not have the space to argue this point fully, Instead, I intend to write a much longer paper defending this claim. To be brief, the injustice is the denial of a child at least one of his or her natural parents, and in general, a mother and a father. No amount of love and affection justifies this being done deliberately.

In summary:

1) Marriage is a social institution and legal contract. However, I point out there is a reason why it exists, like any social institution - the ensuring a child is raised by his or her natural parents. It benefits the common good in a way that friendships and same sex relationships do not.

2) When I talked about family in my previous essay, I was referring to the natural family. Yes, an is does not automatically imply an ought. But I think it reasonable to believe that children need their mothers and fathers - mothers and fathers are not interchangeable.

3) To say that procreation in infertile heterosexual couples is possible in principle but not in practice is not to Platonicise the relationships. There are no "forms". But there are universals, just within the particulars. Damage to a thing does not change its essential nature, in the same way that a bird with its wings cut off is still a bird. It is not in the nature of same sex relationships to be able to bring forth the natural family. Meanwhile, between a man and a woman, this is in the nature of the relationship. To call something of an entirely different nature the same as the thing - be it birds, cars, relationships is a mistake.

4) The injustice when it comes to same sex marriage is not to do with parenting ability. Rather, it is the institutionalising of the deliberate denial of a child his natural parents, a mother and a father. Mothers and fathers are not optional, they have something unique to offer a child. Denying a child his or her heritage is the injustice.

About Same Sex Marriage

Before I begin this writing, I will clearly state what I do NOT defend.

 

First, I do not defend or advocate for any people who make fun of people with same sex attractions. Everybody has dignity, made in God's likeness and image. Hence, I condemn this bigotry.

 

Second, I also do not defend any people who physically attack people who have same sex attractions, or people who arbitrarily prevent these brothers and sisters of ours getting jobs. This is gravely unjust, and I applaud people who condemn these kinds of actions.

 

Third, I do not defend the view that there is somehow something sinful about having same sex attractions per se. A person cannot be judged on something they cannot consciously control. A person can only be judged on their actions - it is acting out on those attractions that is the sin. But that is not, fundamentally the point of this essay.

 

In sum, I advocate wholeheartedly the Catholic view of the matter, that people with same sex attractions should be treated with sensitivity and respect, and unjust discrimination should be avoided.

 

The words today about same sex marriage is that it is the seeking of "Equality". However, as I will argue, it is only fair to treat equal, "same" things equally. The thing is, same sex relationships, as I will point out, do not have the relevant sameness to opposite sex relationships to participate in the relationship of marriage. This is a just discrimination, given that the relationships, being fundamentally different cannot be called the same thing and treated the same. In this writing, I will show what the important difference is.

 

First thing to note is that every single one of us comes from the union of a man and a woman. Every child needs and mother and a father. This basic anthropological fact explains why marriage exists, it is, at its deepest level, about being a foundation for the family. The family is in principle, if not in practice, possible in the relationship between a man and a woman. However, this love is subordinate to the higher purpose of being the foundation for the family, and so, every human life.

 

If we accept the premises that we all come from the union between a man and a woman, and that is is very important that a child has both of his or her parents, than it follows that the relationship that ties children to their natural parents be protected. This is ultimately what marriage is all about - it is deeper than just love between two people. Instead, the love is for the core of the family, and so the core of society. The reason why marriage exists is to enshrine this vital relationship.

 

Same sex relationships, although many of them loving, cannot even in principle be the foundation for the natural family. It is a biological fact that such relationships are inherently sterile. Thus, in an important way they are not the same as opposite sex relationships. As a result, it is a mistake to treat them as the same in calling them both marriage. One aspect may well be there - love. However, one similarity does not make the relationships the same. While in opposite sex relationships, the possibility of the natural family is present, in same sex relationships, the opposite is the case. They are fundamentally different things. In this way, it is dishonest to call both relationships equivalent - because in this important way they are not.

 

I foresee some objections. Firstly, one may say "You say that marriage has the purpose of procreation and family. But what about infertile couples? Their unions are sterile. If this is so, why can't gays marry, given their relationships are also sterile?"

 

In response, I draw the distinction between something being possible in principle and possible in practice. Something being possible in principle means being possible in relation to the definition of the thing. Opposite sex relationships, by definition, male and female, have the possibility in principle of procreation and so, the natural family. The fact that there are some that do not live this out in practice - like infertile couples - does not change the fact that procreation is still possible in principle in these relationships. Between two men or two women, by contrast, the natural family cannot even in principle occur. Same sex relationships have no possibility whatsoever of natural procreation. So, they also cannot, even in principle, cannot take part in the relationship that is supposed to protect the natural family. Infertile couples, by contrast, at least have the procreative ability in principle, just sadly not in practice.

 

Second objection is to point out that people with same sex attractions are just as good parents as people who are heterosexual. One could possibly infer therefore, that gender is not relevant in the raising of children, and so same sex marriage is therefore licit.

 

I reply that yes, people with same sex attractions are just as able to love as those who have opposite sex attractions. But love in terms of affection is not the only thing that is important in a child's development. Instead, if love is willing the good of the other person, then it is reasonable to say that real love would not deny a child one of his or her parents. Single parent cases or adoption cases are making the best of a bad situation - there is no intent of a child losing any relationship with either of his or her parents in most of these situations. However, in the case of same sex relationships, a child is deliberately denied a mother or a father. This is unjust - an injustice that no amount of well-meaning love and affection can fix.

 

 I have argued briefly why same sex “marriage" is not about equality, given that such relationships are inherently different to opposite sex relationships. While opposite sex relationships can, at least in principle, be the source of life and the family (the reason why such relationships are enshrined in marriage the way they are), same sex relationships are not of this nature, not even in principle. They are not the same, and so it is a mistake to call them so equivalent. I do not deny that there is love in same sex relationships. But there are thousands of ways to love - one does not have to be married to love. Children need their mothers and their fathers and stable families - and marriage is the best means we have of attaining this ideal. Same sex relationships, as I have pointed out, cannot provide these things, and so, cannot honestly take part in the relationship of marriage.

 

In writing what I have, I am protecting marriage. Again, I reiterate my points made at the start of my essay - all unjust discrimination should be avoided - attacking, making fun of and the like. ALL people have inherent dignity. I am simply pointing out that we discriminate when there are relevant differences. We treat different things differently. As I have pointed out, same sex relationships and opposite sex relationships are inherently different, one having within itself the possibility of the natural family, the other never having this possibility. So, it is an injustice, indeed dishonest to call them equal and the same when they are not

 

 

Against "Abolishing Morality"

I recently read an intriguing and disturbing article "Abolishing Morality", arguing why, assuming error theory is true, why abolishing all moral thinking and discourse will be better for society, solving more problems than morality has managed to solve. I argue two main points concerning the article: first, that the author's main arguments as to the usefulness of abolishing morality are not convincing, and second that the underlying theory he is arguing for - error theory, the theory that there are no moral facts, that any moral claim is false, is fundamentally mistaken. Instead, I argue that there are indeed moral facts.

First, I want to be as fair as possible to the error theorist position. Why would anybody argue that there are no moral facts? I see two main reasons. First is the argument from naturalism. Naturalism is basically the idea that any facts should be provable by science, or else, not contradict science. Seems fair enough. According to this argument, one cannot find moral facts by looking at the world in an empirical manner - by means of observation and sense data. One can travel the world, looking around, but one will not find a moral fact. Instead, moral facts appear to be beyond the purview of scientific enquiry. GE Moore was quite right in saying that one can identify any natural property of a thing in the world one likes. But goodness is never in and of itself a part of that thing. It is always an open question as to whether that property is good. Given that moral claims of good and evil cannot be reconciled with naturalism, given they are not in and of themselves part of the empirical world, and indeed appear to be impossible to find by empirical methods, it seems that there are no moral facts. This seems like a reasonable argument, if the naturalist position is true. But I argue that naturalism is in no ways a true account of reality. It captures part of reality to be sure. But not all of it.

The above argument from naturalism assumes that all of reality is understandable and discoverable by scientific means, by empirical methods. I argue that is not the case. Before we do any science, we have to have particular beliefs on the nature of reality - in particular that it is knowable, and that the laws of logic that we use to apprehend reality actually are reliable. These things that presuppose science cannot be discovered by scientific means. Instead, they transcend empirical reality. Indeed, scientific enquiry depends on things that cannot in principle be apprehended by scientific means. One can look at a brain scan all day long, but one cannot access the inner dimensions of a thought. One can know every empirical fact about a book - its mass, its dimensions, the chemical composition of the ink. But none of these scientific facts give any information about the meaning of the words within. My point is, is that naturalism does not capture the fullness of reality. As a result, it is a mistake to look at the world solely in naturalistic terms. Indeed, this naturalism is born of the practice of reductionism in science - narrowing the scope of enquiry to that which can be apprehended by the senses and measured. The point is that reductionism which gives birth to naturalism is a narrowing of the scope. The problem with naturalism is that it makes the unwarranted assumption that this narrowed scope view of reality is all of reality. If naturalism is mistaken, then it follows that the argument from naturalism is also mistaken. Scientific claims and moral claims are of different natures, and describe different aspects of reality.

A second argument for error theory is the argument from moral controversy.It seems reasonable to suggest that if something is a fact, it should be indisputable. If there is disagreement about scientific facts, there is a clear way to check - go and do the experiment and find out. Even so, in most disciplines, the facts are normally not up for debate. There tends to be some level of stability as to what the actual facts are. Ethics, it seems, is a different thing entirely. Instead of there being consensus, there tends to be major disputes - sometimes people fighting over ethical questions. And throughout history, there has been no end in sight to these disputes. We keep doing the same things, making the same excuses, we as a species certainly have not  become moral. Indeed, there are even different ethical codes and practices in different parts of the world. One key example would be cannibalism. In places like Fiji in the past, this was seen as morally acceptable. Contrast that with the European world, and it is seen as taboo. Moral relativism being descriptively true, appears to suggest that there is no agreement over the moral facts. Indeed, this data of moral disagreement, relativism and failure to develop any sort of uniformity seems to suggest that there are no moral facts. While in science, there has been consensus on the facts, and through this consensus, progress, in ethics we are still a mess. And so, it seems logical to suggest that there are no moral facts, that error theory is true.

Although there is much truth in the above argument, I hold that it does not prove that there are no moral facts. More, that there is disagreement about these facts, and that we humans are often very bad at being moral. I observe that there are at least some moral values that are common to every culture around the world. For example, not murdering, looking after ones children, being brave, not taking what does not belong to you. Where there are exceptions to the basics, these are due to excuses, rationalisation. In the case of murder, those cultures that permitted the killing of innocent people made excuses as to why the victims were not human, or else, were permissible to kill. The basic moral fact of the value of human life remains. The reason why we even today have not come to any sort of moral consistency is that ethics is not a black and white game of logic. We are always torn between the true good for ourselves and others, and temporarily attractive goods that in the end cause harm. We are tempted. Evil is attractive. If it was not, we would not do evil. Indeed, the argument above, in pointing out moral inconsistency, in doing so supposes that there is moral reality. And the reality is, it is not a perfect world. If there were no moral facts, our pointing out to a child that hitting his brother is wrong would make no sense to him. The reason why a child is able to see the wrongness of things when it is pointed out to him is that there is a moral dimension to reality. We humans are able to see it with our consciences. I argue that there are ways of rationally figuring our the moral facts - the system of natural law is the best way, I think, of achieving the goal of ethics - human flourishing. But that is for another essay.

Having established that it is more likely that there are moral facts, rather than not, I want to address the case that abolishing morality is ultimately better for us. First argument the article presents is that, supposedly, societies that function on morality are intrinsically authoritarian, elitist, marked by economic inequality, social inequality and war. In other words, they are inextricably bound up with moral societies. Since these things are reasonably judged to be bad things, it seems to follow that the morality that underpins such societies should be abolished. There are other ways of solving our problems. This is the basic argument. And I can see why the author would make such a case. The historical example I imagine he has in mind is Christian Europe. And it is fair to say that it was marked by a level of authoritarianism and elitism. In particular, the hierarchical society, and the imposition of morality by the Church. And indeed there were, historically, large gaps between rich and poor. On one hand, there were peasants, living a hand to mouth existence, and on the other hand, the aristocracy, kings etc. , very rich. And the history of war in European history is clear. There are reasons behind such an argument. But I think that is no reason why error theory should be adopted, and that we should give up morality for the good of society.

I notice that one could argue for the above case on historical grounds. But go a bit further, and the history defeats the claim that moral societies have such qualities intrinsic to them. First, especially during the 17th and 18th centuries, European societies challenged such things as authoritarianism and elitism. Kant with his philosophy that marked the enlightenment, argued for people having moral autonomy, to think for oneself, rather than rely on the authority of the church. Concerning elitism, it is noteworthy that during the French revolution, the nobility lost their privileges, Louis XVI executed. As for economic inequality, we have political parties today working on left wing principles that try to even the odds for those poor and marginalized. And war? There are many examples of European society challenging war. The moratorium movement that arose out of the Vietnam war is a case in point. The point I want to make is this: in none of these historical cases was society amoral! This proves that such things that the author of "abolishing morality" claims are intrinsically part of moral societies are not intrinsic to them at all. As a result, morality itself is not what causes these problems. And so, abolishing morality would hardly solve these problems.

A second argument that the author of "Abolishing Morality" makes as to why hard error theory would be good for society is the claim that looking at issues as moral issues just simply causes unnecessary confusion, kindling passions, exciting the parties involved in issues at stake, preventing clear thought and compromise. Of course, this argument assumes that error theory is correct, and that there is ultimately no moral facts of the matte - and so, we should evaluate our problems apart from morality. We should look at problems as partial conflicts of interest, and evaluate moral rights in terms of legal rights, contracts etc. Although it is descriptively true that moral issues can create conflict, incite strong and fiery emotional responses, and can possibly prevent compromise, I argue again that is no reason why morality should be abolished.

Arguing in a similar vein to my last counter argument, I observe that lack of rationality and hot tempers is not as such intrinsic to discussing issues from a moral standpoint. It is perfectly possible to let the other person speak, and listen to their position. One does not have to become emotional and possibly violent when discussing issues from a moral standpoint. Indeed, an important moral principle is to love ones neighbour, which means treating them with the respect worthy of a human being. And of course, that means listening. A key problem with the above argument is that it assumes that moral principles always have an equal and opposite counter principle, and that there is no rational way to adjudicate between a moral conflict because of this. I think not. There are things that are truly good for human beings. But they exist on a hierarchy, based on how they support the flourishing of human beings. Life is the most fundamental - for without life, one cannot flourish in any way, let alone enjoy the other goods that make human life worth living. Developing a theory of hierarchy of goods, originally created by Aristotle is beyond the scope of this essay. But the point is that it can serve as a way of adjudicating between moral rights.

In conclusion, I have argued that the article "Abolishing Morality" is mistaken for the following reasons: firstly because the error theory itself appears to be mistaken. The argument from naturalism falls because naturalism as a position is untenable. It does not capture the whole of reality. The argument from moral disagreements does not hold, partly because there are still moral basics common to all cultures, and partly because we are capable of teaching people ethics. If there were no moral facts, pointing them out to young children would be nonsensical. But, instead, they are capable of seeing moral right or wrong, when it is pointed out to them. The arguments why morality should be abolished do not stand as well. The claims that moral societies are intrinsically authoritarian, elitist, economically unequal and marked by war is false historically. There are multiple examples of societies challenging such things - while remaining societies that did not do away with ethics. The other argument, the argument from emotion and confusion also is not convincing in showing why we would be better off without morality. This is because, firstly, one does not have to become an irrational bigot to discuss ethics - indeed a critical principle in many moral codes is respect for other people. And secondly, there are ways of adjudicating between parties who have moral disputes - by looking at moral rights not as equal, but part of an integrated hierarchy. Indeed, my position is that ethics can be made rational sense of, and that this hierarchy can be developed. Natural law ethics is the way forward. In future writings, I hope to show how this system can help us make sense of ethics. Of course, the question as to whether we will become good and virtuous by understanding ethics is an open one. I suspect that will not be the case. Living a moral life is hard. And we are all tempted. Knowing the truth is not even half the battle.

How Understandings of the Human Person Drastically Transforms the Search for Happiness

Note: The views of this and my other papers express my positions at that specific time. They may have changed since then.


I observe a common source underlying different interpretations of ethics. Reading the chapter on humanity in "In Defence of The Enlightenment", I noticed an important similarity between Christians and the deists of the Age of Enlightenment. The commonality is the seeking of happiness, done by love. In the same way that Aristotle posited the goal of ethics as being human flourishing, Hume, Diderot, Voltaire et al. saw the same. I am not writing as such to defend Christianity. But the goal of ethics being human happiness, identified by people as far distant as Aristotle and the enlightenment philosophers is the unifying heart of Christianity. The very meaning of God being love is the love of willing the good of the other. Although I think a loving god unlikely to exist, the idea of being holy as being a person transformed by love is a beautiful thing. Love is what gives rise to ethics, or, love is the virtue that helps us to live the two great aims - doing good and avoiding evil. This is at least clear. However, I see major differences in how this basic of ethics, this "ground" may be applied, depending on ones understanding of the human person.

Kant it appears had it right when he made it a basic principle of his moral philosophy of never treating people merely as a means to an end. A person can be a means to an end, but not merely so. One must respect their autonomy, never looking at people as things. Hence, it is for example gravely immoral for a rich man to casually pick out a person on the streets for their internal organs to be cut out to extend his life by an extra ten years. A person willingly giving their organs though is a different case, not one of mere use as a means to an end. I cannot say for certain, but it seems Kantian ethics works similarly to Christian ethics: working on the premise of the transcendent value of human beings.  What is transcendent value? It is value that goes above or transcends the way people happen to be, good or bad. It means that a person's value does not depend on what they can do, what they contribute, their race, class, gender etc. Instead, humans having transcendent value means their worth transcends all these things. Transcendent human value means people are not given ethical regard based on what they do, but from what they are, their unchanging essence. The question oas to whether we have an essence is critical for today. For the question of transcendent value of human beings changes how the basic principle of ethics as being for human flourishing is to be applied. The point of this essay is to show the horrible consequences of denying the transcendent value of human beings.

If humans have transcendent value, it follows by definition that they cannot be used as sacrificial chess pieces so to speak in the pursuit of the happiness of humanity in the abstract. If humans have transcendent value, then absolutely no individual can be treated unethically for the greater good. The value of the individual is inviolable. As a result it is, for example, under this metaphysics, it is absolutely wrong to torture people, as a person's worth is not taken away by past actions, no matter how evil. In a similar way, if humans have transcendent value, then it is wrong to to abort the unborn. If human value is not dependent on level of development, then it follows that under such an understanding of the human person, abortion is morally wrong, no matter the excuse. My position on this issue is more compassionate and nuanced than this paragraph may suggest. But it is beyond the scope of this essay to discuss the ethics of abortion at length. I simply am writing to demonstrate the effects of transcendent value of human beings has on the pursuit of human happiness. I digress. A third concrete example: if human value is sacred, unconditionally so, then it follows that it is always gravely immoral to exploit people, as formal slaves, or simply workers in sweatshops, no matter how many people are made incredibly happy by the wealth such exploitation may produce. My point is, such a view of the human person ensures the application of the principle of seeking human flourishing applies to all individual humans. Indeed, it seems to follow that if love is unconditional, such a view of the human person is the only real way to truly apply radical agape love. As I will show, when the transcendent value of humans is denied, this leaves the basic principle of love gravely damaged.

If a person's value is not transcendent, and so, is conditional, it follows that a persons value depends on things that can change. And, as a result, a person's value is never constant. Instead, under such an understanding of the human person, there can come many times when a person can be seen as no longer valuable, and so, evil can be done to the individual. I notice that a way we tend to classify people is by their instrumental worth - how much they are able to do, in other words. This can especially be seen in how we use words like deadbeat as a sneering spit on those who are very low on the social ladder. There is merit in evaluating people in terms of ability and work ethic. But, when ones moral worth depends on instrumental value, there are terrible consequences. It means, with no transcendent human value, human moral worth can justifiably be organised in a hierarchy. Those lower on the chain can be used as currency to buy the happiness of the rest of humanity, those with greater instrumental worth. Slave classes seem perfectly justifiable under such an understanding of the human person. Some have tried to classify people's moral worth based on level of sentience. This is another form of the denial of transcendent worth. And the consequence of this is that nobody is truly safe from being declared a non person, able to be used merely as an instrument for the happiness of others, rather than looked at as a loved member of the human family. Those with major mental disabilities, under such an understanding of humanity, are non persons, and so can justifiably be treated as such. Let me make it very clear that I am not defending this. Instead, I am writing to demonstrate what denial of transcendent human worth can do to the human search for happiness. When individual worth becomes dependent on changing things, then the pursuit of human happiness can simply be a question of the greatest happiness for the greatest number - at least some can be used as chess pieces to be sacrificed in the battle for happiness. Love becomes less about love of individual humans, but love of humanity in the abstract.

In writing, I hopefully have been able to show the consequences of denial of transcendent human worth has for ethics. Indeed the same goal of human flourishing takes two radical different courses depending on how one sees human beings. For true love to exist, we must see eachother as people to be loved for our own sake, rather than as things to be used, or beings whose worth can vanish in a moment of misfortune. An aspect of ethics is having the moral eyes to see moral principles. I know most of you my readers will be able to see clearly the truth of at least the principle of treating people as having transcendent worth. It is sad though that there are thinkers out there who close their hearts, and seek proof of the mind alone to confirm human transcendent worth, when ethics to some extent is a synthesis of heart and mind. But, I have faith that there is a way of proving this worth so critical for a world of real love. This will be another piece of writing.

Thoughts on Australia Day

It seems that every Australia day, I hear rather left wing writers talking about what a terrible thing Australia day is, given it in reality was the start of British colonisation in Australia, and the start of a tragic period for the Aboriginal peoples who lived on the continent for at least 40,000 years previously. My take on the issue is that yes, they indeed do have a point. We have a very sad history in that respect. But that is no reason to be sad and sour on Australia day. Part of being a member of a country is to look squarely at the past, learn from it, and so, make things better.

The location where one happens to live is, in most cases, purely accidental. We do not choose where we end up, or the people we live with. To be a patriot, with this in mind, is rather similar to being a part of a family. It is loving the country you are from, not so much because you chose it, but because you are part of it. And this love, this patriotic love, necessarily means doing what is necessary to make life better and happier for all the other people you are with in the country. And this means learning from the past, and addressing ugly issues, those that may be more comfortable just to forget. In a similar way that it is an act of love to point out to someone when they are being horrible to others so they can have the opportunity to change their behavior and become better people, I think it fair to think that it is hardly unpatriotic to have a fair sense of sadness as to the consequences of British colonisation in Australia. It does not have to be hatred of the country. But more calling all Australians to a higher moral standard - to be fair to the people that lived here for so long, to help address the injustices of the past.

What I am saying is that it is impossible to change the past. It is possible to say that "I am lucky to be Australian", but at the same time, be sad over the tragedy of how this period of Australian history began. For this sadness is the demonstration of a true patriotism, love for the people in the country you live in, the country you did not choose - to a large extent, a larger family. We are lucky to be Australians. I see Australia day as a way of celebrating being part of a larger family, the nation. The fact that the day happens to mark the start of a rather brutal occupation should be a reason to stop and think about how we can be better members of this national family - to learn from the past, and so, make Australia more a country to be admired. To love ones country is to admit the faults of the past - and to make the country better by learning those lessons. Be proud of being Australian - and remember that that pride means living as the best member one can be of the nation. We rise or fall together.

How Harris Killed His Own Case

It interests me the fact that Sam Harris in “The Moral Landscape” makes it very explicit that he is not arguing that we can base all our ethics on a purely Darwinian biological framework. If I understand him correctly, he basically stated that we have transcended this whole process of evolution and its crass “physics” of selfish genes. This strikes me as inconsistent on two basic pieces of evidence – how he attempts to follow mechanistic neuroscience down the rabbit hole to its logical conclusions of no free will, and also in the fact that he and other New Atheists consistently blast Christians for being inconsistent with the science. But, in this case, he himself makes an unwarranted leap of faith. Let me explain.

If we follow pure mechanistic science on its own terms, the idea that the universe works on laws and causality alone, and we trust the workings of Darwinistic biology, that organisms exist to keep on existing and passing on their genes to the next generations, then it appears that all ethics are simply a product of this ruling process… Ethics should evolve to fit this model, if we are indeed a part of this process. Funny thing is, Harris claims we have reached a point where we transcend the system that we are apparently locked in. It certainly appears we do. But that is beside the point. If Harris is really is so committed to following the science wherever it leads, then why does he make this assertion that we transcend the process? What evidence does he have for this? Indeed, he seems to be playing the “free miracle card”…. Doing something like that would get Christians laughed at. Talk about a double standard.

Indeed, there are good reasons to claim we have reached a point of transcending Darwinian process. To truly follow the system of ethics in terms of ethics would be antithetical to the idea of human flourishing that Harris bases his whole book on…. Namely, the idea that we should all be as happy and fulfilled as possible, and avoid the worst possible misery for everyone. This is quite common to both virtue ethics and utilitarianism. In this, he seems to be talking sense. But that’s beside the point. If we are to follow the Darwinian process and derive ethics from it, love would be very conditional. I have written on this before in another essay. We have eugenics and the forced sterilisations of Margaret Sanger to thank for applying Darwinian logic to ethics. Supposing that a consistent Darwinian ethic would be cold and savage, it appears that to solve this problem, Harris has chosen to be inconsistent. If he was consistent, his whole theory would not stand. However, it is ironic that he has not also chosen to be inconsistent with the materialism that inescapably (so it seems), destroys any notion of free will, so crucial for ethics.

I am not going to restate the argument against free will from neuroscience. I’m tired, and pretty tipsy. Let’s start from the point that if it is true, then it opens up a massive can of worms regarding ethics. How can one possibly develop prescriptions on how one is to live one’s life if it is metaphysically impossible to follow them in one way or another? Indeed, the person does not exist in this account – they are reduced to an indifferent process of chemical reactions in the brain. If one cannot really make a choice, what is the point of developing moral laws and values by the use of scientific method? And if the processes in the brain are themselves irrational, how can we even trust our thoughts on science (I am borrowing Lewis’ idea)… Our thoughts seem infinitely more likely to be mistaken, given an infinite amount of ways to be wrong, and one way to be right.  It is possible to ignore these problems, but it still makes ethics, in reality, completely pointless. Also, why do we not hold dogs, prawns, mud crabs and babies morally accountable? Because they do not have the reason to consciously choose their actions one way or another. Not only does lack of free will cut out any notion of choice from any party, rational or not, it also undercuts the reliable of rationality, if we are perfectly consistent. This creates at least as many problems for Harris than the logical conclusions of Darwinism does! It is strange that he does not take the step of evasion in this case as well. Why?

My answer to this question is, of course, a theory. I cannot know his mind. But it appears that he is desperate not to give Christianity even an inch. Christianity stresses the importance of free will… And so, Harris appears to not want to give the idea any credit… At any cost, although it seems he refuses to see the horrible cost of expunging free will has on ethics. The metaphysics is poison, as I have argued for briefly. The claim of hostility to Christianity seems quite well justified. He had written “Letter to a Christian Nation” and “The End of Faith” – both polemically atheistic books…. And in “The Moral Landscape”, he goes out of way to attack the “immorality of Christianity” (on a superficial level he had a point, but that’s for another essay)…. If he really wanted to save his case, he really should have sidestepped the free will issue! It is an odd, but perhaps explainable anomaly.

This writing does not in any way prove we have free will…. Simply that Harris has been inconsistent in his writing of “The Moral Landscape”. The issue of free will is critical, to put it lightly. I will probably spend my life trying to solve it, if it does not drive me as mad as Nietzsche in the process…

Aaron Carlin 1/12/2014

Gender is a Construct. So What?

The feminists thinkers despise the idea of gender, supposing that it is simply a "repressive social construct". But what does it mean to be a social construct? As I have reflected on it, gender being a social construct is irrelevant to its worth or grounding in reality. Indeed, most things are "socially constructed". The question to ask the concepts we are given is how well they reflect the way things are.

I see two senses of the idea of a social construct. First sense is the idea of a thing given to us by society - by such things as direct teaching, books, advertising etc. One can argue that this is a categorically bad thing as per the fashionable enlightenment ideal of knowing things for yourself, but I argue that is not the case. The enlightenment ideal is critical thinking - hardly a bad thing. But to critically think supposes knowledge. And given that our minds are to a large extent tabula rasa(blank slates) at birth, we learn not in isolation, but communally, socially. And so, it follows that most of our knowledge is socially constructed. This hardly means that all our knowledge is automatically false. We are taught proper use of our senses and reason, and so, language, to be able to think clearly about what is. The point is that all of our knowledge is initially socially constructed. Indeed, it depends on this construction for its existence. A baby untaught, unhelped by by other people, will not learn very much. We cannot exist as islands. It is only after the "social construction" of knowledge and understanding takes place that we can apply the enlightenment ideal of "knowing thyself".

This is a second sense of social construct, one which I think is closer to understanding the feminist claim that gender is simply socially constructed. As discussed before, most of our knowledge is socially constructed. It comes from various means of social input. We cannot easily learn in isolation. The first sense of social construction concerns the understanding of what is. The second sense is teleological, or goal based, concerning what ought to be. A social construct as a teleology is a recommended or demanded way of thinking or behaving which is conducive to a specific goal. In this way, social constructs in this sense is not arbitrary. They depend on the purpose that brings them into existence. Law is socially constructed in this sense. We follow it to be able to live harmoniously together in society. The value of the goals these constructs exist in service of are what are critical to always evaluate. Some examples: The social construct is the law to drive on the left side of the road in Australia. This is aligned to the telos of safety and order on the roads. This, arguably is a good goal, and so, is a reasonable social construct. Another example: the social construct is the custom of hitting every black woman one meets. The telos of this is to "punish inferiors". Are they inferior? I would argue at great lengths that of course they are not inferior. Hence, the telos is unreasonable, and so the socially constructed custom is also unreasonable. Gender behavior seems to be within this second category I have been analysing. As I have been trying to establish , social constructs are not inherently a bad thing. In the second sense of the word, they are teleological. To evaluate any socially constructed behavior , the telos that gives it form must be analysed. If it is a good telos , then the construct is at least reasonable.

In writing what I have, it means I in part agree with the feminist claims. Gender in terms of behavior is a social construct - a "second sense" social construct. It is teleological. And people can choose whether or not to conform. But, as I have been writing to establish, this does not automatically mean that traditional ideas of gender are therefore a bad thing. The purpose gender behavior serves as a social construct is what must be analysed. The feminists tend to attack the feminists tend to attack the very idea of gender, as they see it as a curtailment of freedom. To some extent this is true. But to subordinate oneself to any goal is to sacrifice some freedom. One's freedom is given to the goal in question. So, gender being a curtailment of freedom is is in this aspect an irrelevant point as to whether it has any degree of value in terms of human flourishing. But one may also object that gender is an attack on freedom , as it is a set of proscribed behaviors that one must conform to. Fair enough. Coercion is not fair. But is it coercion? People can choose one way or another. There is no law that one must be masculine or feminine. One may argue that it is, in a Millsian sense, a tyranny of the majority. But, the fact remains that one is still free to choose one way or another. And part of being a rational adult means providing sound reasons for ones behavior. One can do whatever one likes. To cry that one is a prisoner of the majority is Sartrean bad faith. In summary of this section of the essay, gender may limit freedom. But all actions towards a goal do that. The question is whether the goal is worthy enough to limit ones freedom for it, to give it as currency so to speak in a currency of freedom and action. And the idea that people are forced to act in these confines is mistaken. One is free to choose. Now the question is: is the social construct of gender good or bad? Does it have a worthy goal to give ones freedom to or not? Is it, therefore, something of societal value?

As an axiom, I observe that men and women are clearly different.  It has become fashionable to deny this. But I find it difficult to believe that one can be completely wrong  about what one sees in the people one meets everyday. That is not to say all men are all the same, and all women are completely the same. But there are aspects that set the sexes apart. There are clear biological differences, some very important ones psychological. Why do they exist? Although it is politically incorrect to point this out, these differences are ordered to the procreation of the species. We depend on each other for such a thing to happen. And we also critically depend on the continued love and relationship between our parents to be able to flourish. We do not last on our own. We humans take a long time to mature. The point is, our differences are ordered towards a particular good - the survival and flourishing of our species. Without this good being actualised, we cannot possibly enjoy any other goods. Where are we without life?

This may sound as if I am simply defining gender as as the physical differences between men and women. Not so. I am using these differences as a foundation for the goal of gender. Gender behavior itself arises from these differences. I think they are a two way process of acting out the defining features of ones gender as stamped into the body, and playing the game of attraction with the opposite sex, which makes the reason for gender in the first place actual. The behavior is the manifestation of ones sex in the world.

I will give an example. Again, this is politicall incorrect - in writing this, I am challenging an entire system. Let's take the example of strength. Men, most of the time are built physically stronger than women. It sets them apart, and so gives them a way to be attractive. I think, by and large, we respond to those differences. And so, a bloke my volunteer to take the bins out for the girls he works with, and so, maintains his honour as a potential husband. A man who whinges and whines, by contrast, will not be attractive. My point is that behavior affects the differences, differences that draw men and women together.

So there are a class of behaviors that reflect the differences between men and women. They are not as such bad things, given they are conducive to the foundations of families. Without attraction, there is no sex, and certainly no family. Sex without bonding is either an empty hook up or rape, neither good for the flourishing of human beings. However, one could object that this is all just a generalisation - and it is wrong to generalise. I think this is mistaken. Generalisation is a way of finding out about people, what they do, how they behave typically. It is finding the mean of human behaviors, to so be able to understand people better. That there are exceptions does not prove that there are no general behaviors that the sexes exhibit to play the game of attraction. Rather, that there are some people that differ a little. And that's OK. That does not diminish the purpose gender behavior has. It is, as I am arguing, healthy if not forced.

I forsee another objection. There is a problem with gender behavior, given that some of it is detrimental to the people involved. Is it really right for women to dress half naked to please men? Is it really right for men to punch eachother to a pulp in pursuit of women? This is a reasonable objection, and highlights that although gender behavior in principle is a good thing, ordered towards love, in practice it can be warped. Instead of expressing the good differences, sometimes such behavior can be perverted, either warping the differences in one way or another, or being harmful to other goods. Men, being mostly stronger than women, are attractive if they can defend their families. But fighting and brawling is a perverse exaggeration of this. It is wrong given it harms other goods such as health and social cohesion. In the example of women dressing half naked to please men, , this is a case of taking the male attraction to the female body to an extreme, in this case, encouraging lust, which is not conducive to the love that gender behavior should help promote. My point is that gender behaviors can and should be critiqued. Indeed some are not consistent with the goal of gender behaviors, but instead cause great harm. One should never do evil, even if it is socially acceptable.

One may also object on these grounds: that gender behavior is oppressive and unjust as it means people must suppress some aspects of their behavior and fit a specific model to be attractive. My response is yes, that is true. And so what? We must conform to certain specific standards all the time in order to achieve the good goals we set ourselves. As discussed, to do anything, freedom is the currency. To be a great philosopher, one must study and philosophise. Those are the conditions. To be attractive, one must play the social game, and do what it takes, within reason and without evil, to encourage attractiveness. One must conform to reality to achieve goals. It is narcissistic and futile to expect the world to change for ones desires. It is a hard reality that one must work at attraction. But it must be done. Reality will not change because one wants it to change.

In summary, it is true that gender is a social construct - but it is a rational one ordered to the good of marriage and family by helping to facilitate attraction between men and women. It can be distorted, so it is critical to critique gender behavior to ensure it is consistent with its end and the flourishing of other goods.  Not all socially acceptable actions are good. Yes, it means a certain curtailment of freedom. But all actions towards a goal mean that to some extent. And yes, the reality that gender behavior means the need for behavioral adaptation in order to facilitate attraction means one has to conform and limit ones individuality. But, we do that in achieving any goal. To seek something means to subordinate ones abilities and inclinations towards that end. Like an Olympic athlete giving themselves to their sport in order to win a medal. Gender is a social construct. But it is hardly a bad one if attraction marriage and family are a good thing. It is fair enough to choose not to live the behaviors. But it is another thing again to complain of lack of attraction when one scorns how and why people are attracted.

Aaron Carlin, January 2015.

The Partnership Between Faith and Reason

Oftentimes I have heard faith as being understood as “Believing things without a shred of evidence”, or, “throwing reason out the window”…. Fair enough, if one is a fideist, working on blind faith. With this in mind though, I contend that it is a grave mistake, indeed a caricature, to represent all faith as having this non- intellectual quality. By contrast, in Catholicism at least, faith and reason are partners. As the recent Pope Benedict XVI put it, faith and reason serve like two wings, which together take us towards truth. This essay will present the case to support this claim.

The best way to show how faith and reason are in no ways in conflict is to present some examples in everyday life which illustrate the concept, before moving on to show how Catholicism in particular does not fit into the fideist, “faith alone” bracket. One rather funny case which serves as an example was the exchange between mathematician John Lennox and biologist Richard Dawkins, when they discussed questions of faith. To paraphrase Dawkins, he stated that “You wouldn’t need to have faith if there were any evidence”. Lennox replied: “You have faith that your wife loves you Mr. Dawkins, is there any evidence for that?” The wife case – an example of faith and reason not being in conflict, but reason grounding that faith. In this case, one can see all kinds of evidence to make it seem reasonable to suggest somebody loves you – always kind to you, patient with you even on a grumpy day, the daily kiss, moving countries for you etc. But, with this in mind, one cannot know for absolute certain – as one cannot know the heart. But, with that in mind, that does not make it unreasonable to believe that the person loves you. In this way, in this example, reason is what grounds the faith. If the evidence were to suggest lack of love – not returning calls, staring into space when with you, flirting with every other person in sight, then it would be unreasonable, indeed downright folly to have any sort of faith that the other person loves. . In this way, in this example, reason is what grounds the faith.  Here is one case study. Another case will further illuminate the idea that faith and reason do not necessarily contradict each other.

Now, let us take the example of going on a voyage. Before one travels, one must have a reasonable faith that the ship will be able to make the trip without sinking. One cannot know for absolute sure that the ship won’t sink – hence there is an element of trust involved. But, reason is what grounds the faith. In this case, one assesses the evidence, to then make a judgment which has an element of faith involved…. Are there any holes in the deck? Is the engine working? Is the captain sober? Is the ship strong enough to make its way through the Northwest Passage? If the evidence seems to suggest yes, then one can put ones faith in the reliability of the ship, and so set sail. In this way, there is an element of faith involved, but it is faith anchored in reason. In this way, it is a “Trust in things not seen”, in this case, that she ship will survive the voyage. It is indeed faith. But it is by no means the throw your brain out the window, believe without evidence sort of faith that some militant atheists like to caricature faith as.  This serves as a second example of how faith and reason do not necessarily contradict.

A third and final example of faith being trust in things unseen, while supported by reason, is the case of quantum mechanics in physics. This really captures the aspect of mystery which faith can lead to – even when supported by reason. Physicists, using reason and looking carefully at experimental and mathematical evidence, came to some shocking conclusions as to the nature of matter at the atomic and sub atomic level – a strange world where matter can be waves and waves can be matter, matter can be in many places at once, and this matter-energy duality can even interfere with itself. The results of quantum mechanics are very strange and unusual, to put it very mildly. But, scientists accept quantum mechanics with faith, due to trusting the reason that they applied to even come up with this way of understanding the nature of reality on the micro scale – even if the results of this are confusing, seemingly absurd. As Richard Feynman so aptly put it “If you think you understand quantum mechanics, you don’t understand quantum mechanics”. In this way, reason underpins faith, which can take one to a level over and above reason. Not for lack of reason. But more lack of understanding for the human mind.

With part one of this short piece finished, giving life to some real examples of faith and reason working together, reason grounding faith, part two will defend the case that Catholicism at least is not in any ways blind faith. I confess, this will seem fairly weak. This is because, to really make the case for the faith in all its subtlety, answering possible objections, that would take a book in itself – probably multiple books.

What makes Catholicism different to other world religions is that it is centred not so much on a philosophy or a set of ideas, but on a person – Jesus, called The Christ. As Professor John Dixon of Maquarie University put it, Christianity bases itself on precise historical claims, claims that can be checked. For centuries, the faith has been one for scrutiny, ready for anybody to “take a swing”. The faith makes a seemingly absurd claim – that God became one of us, lived among us, died to redeem us of our sins, and to validate his claims to divinity, rose from the dead. Take Jesus out of the picture, and Christianity does not exist. St Paul put it very well, in 1 Cor 15:14, when he said “If Christ has not been raised, then our preaching is in vain, and your faith also in vain”. The faith bases itself on the life and actions of a person. Hence, the evidence to ground a reasonable faith, comes from history. I want to make a very brief summary of why I think it reasonable to put ones faith in Jesus. He claimed that he was God incarnate. The key event that I argue validates this seemingly absurd claim at first glance is that of the resurrection, and linked to that, the behaviour of the Apostles before and after the Resurrection.  If this indeed occurred, then it at least is reasonable to trust Jesus as far more than simply a wise teacher – and so this opens up a whole world of other aspects of faith, which again can be at least fairly deduced. That is where theology comes in.

Firs thing to note: Jesus indeed was dead, so the idea that the disciples just happened to think he was gloriously resurrected due to him surviving the cross just is not credible. The evidence for this can be seen in John’s Gospel, which records he being stabbed in the side, and blood and water gushing out. This, firstly, would have killed him. But the blood and water serves as secondary circumstantial evidence. Death by crucifixion is caused by asphyxiation. As this process happens, and the lungs collapse, water gathers at the bottom of the lungs. So, the blood and water described fits the medical state of affairs of a man killed by crucifixion. In short? He was indeed dead. But that alone does not in any way prove he was resurrected.

So, we have established that Jesus indeed did die on the cross. So the swoon theory is thus not credible. Some have claimed that the disciples stole the body. But, the question is of motives: why would they do that? And why would they then go around preaching that their dead master has come back to life and is Lord? A likely story…. Even so, the evidence suggests strongly against this theory. The Gospels record the Apostles as being deeply upset, fearful, indeed crushed when Jesus was killed on the cross. With this in mind, it thus seems highly unlikely that they would have any reason to possibly be preaching that Jesus was alive…. They, as any normal people would, thought him to be dead, and so, their hope had died with him.

Some have postulated that the Apostles were simply hallucinating when they claimed that Jesus rose from the dead. This is unlikely to be the case for a couple of reasons. Number one, hallucinations are private experiences. People do not have the same hallucinations, much less at the same time. Even more effective as evidence, is the way the Apostles reacted to Jesus’ death – they were crushed, deeply upset. This is not likely to be the state of someone expecting resurrection, or being in a state of wishful thinking. Indeed, when the women came to see the Apostles, shocked and amazed at the resurrection, the Apostles downplayed their words as hysteria. In short, the circumstances suggest that nobody, especially the Apostles, were expecting any sort of supernatural resurrection. Instead, as any normal person would on any normal day (or in this case, tragic set of days), they expected what is normal: the dead stay dead.

But, with this in mind, the Apostles transformed in their outlook after the resurrection… Especially after Pentecost, they became radical, inflamed with passion, unafraid of announcing the Good News – that Jesus is Lord, that he rose from the dead. St Peter, the first Pope, gave a fiery speech, preaching this very message - which ended up converting about 3000 people. There was no political or social gain to be attained by such actions. Indeed they were in time thrown out of the synagogue , and persecuted by Jews and Romans alike – Saul of Tarsus, later to be called Paul, being one example of the killers of the Christians. These people were in a position to know for sure whether or not Jesus rose from the dead. It is extremely unlikely that people would knowingly and willingly die for something they know for sure to be untrue. Hence, I think the circumstantial evidence suggests that something amazing actually did happen that Easter, approximately 2000 years ago. The best explanation of the facts is that Jesus indeed did rise from the dead, and he is who he claims he is. If this is so, then it is also reasonable to have faith in the other aspects of Christianity. If Jesus is indeed Lord, then faith in him is indeed reasonable. And that, in very short, is why I am a Christian.

This is a very short, very abridged summary of the reasons for my faith. There are much more aspects that need to be covered, much more objections. But, that will take an entire book. The purpose of this paper is to show why faith is not necessarily irrational – indeed, reason grounds faith, and then give a quick summary as to why faith is Jesus as a Christian is also supported by reason. As demonstrated, faith is by no means believing without a single shred of evidence. Rather, faith, at least in the Catholic Christian sense, is trusting where the evidence takes you, even if the results of this are out of this world and seemingly crazy at first glance. Faith, in this sense, is supported by reason. But reason alone is not enough, in the same way that faith alone is not enough. The heart and the will must take that step in trusting – and so, living the life of faith. Faith with reason – that is a motto I live by.

Aaron Carlin, October 2014

Critique of the Limits of Science

John Lennox had a point in observing that one can know every fact about the words on a page from a scientific perspective - from chemistry and physics - but this knowledge tells us nothing about the meaning of the words themselves. Indeed, meaning is non physical, transcending physical systems. This is just one of the key limits of science. In a culture that has a habit of portraying science as the only source of real knowledge, I see it as critical that the limits of science be known just as well as all of its achievements... Not to attack science, but to ensure that this field of endeavour does not go outside of its scope.

Reductionism is fair enough in the sense of trying to narrow the scope of enquiry into a thing: to be able to understand certain aspects of it while not being distracted by other aspects. Indeed the way science is done is by reducing the world to what is empirical and able to be measured, as a way of better understanding physical reality. The problem is when one takes things an unwarranted step further, claiming that just because something cannot be reduced to the purely empirical, it therefore does not exist. I can understand to some level Richard Feynman's interlocutor, asking if scientific enquiry destroys the beauty of say, flowers.  If one takes the fallacious eliminative reductionism, which attempts to claim that that the non empirical aspects of the flower do not exist - its sheer beauty and the thoughts of romance that come with it, then yes, the question seems reasonable. But if there very clearly exists reality beyond the empirical, it is unjustified to claim it does not exist, as eliminative materialism tries to do. The more realistic way to apply reductionist thinking is as a way to better understand the physical components of reality i.e the flower. This does not take away the beauty. By contrast, as Feynman appears to see at a deep level, it adds to the beauty. The reductionism of scientific enquiry is a useful way to see the physical aspects of reality more clearly. It is not a bad thing in this context. But it is folly to wear sunglasses for so long to forget the world isn't dark!

If science functions by using the thinking tool of reductionism, and it is also fair to suppose that
the aspects of reality that scientific enquiry filters out using reductionism still have a real existence, it follows that scientific enquiry, although the best thing we have for understanding the physical universe, is fundamentally limited. We can know everything about the brain chemistry of  a person. But we cannot, as such, tap into a person's consciousness. Consciousness, as one example, although linked to matter, cannot be reduced to purely matter. This is just one thing that cannot be completely captured and explained by science. Instead, we have other fields that help us attain knowledge. Aspects of thinking used in science may indeed be applied: careful reasoning, observation, developing and testing theories. But the reductionism in science cannot be applied, This is like making the very thing to be studied disappear before ones eyes. If a thing cannot be reduced to purely the empirical, it obviously cannot be studied by using a method that only looks at the empirical.

I have been pointing out some of the limits of science. In a similar way that science cannot be the only source of knowledge because as part of its method it necessarily reduces things to the empirically observable and measurable, I challenge the claim that science is the source of real knowledge, as it uses concepts and ideas that are not discovered by the scientific method. Mathematics especially is a case in point. That and the laws of logic. They cannot, as such, be discovered by empirical scientific means. To even do science, the laws of logic are taken as axioms. Science does not discover logic- instead, the very act of doing science uses and presupposes it. Quite similarly, numbers are not physical, and so able to be found by empirical means. One does not find a number by pure observation. Instead, they are more a priori concepts which can then be applied to the study of the physical world. The idea is that science itself rests on more fundamental realities, and so, cannot be the only source of real knowledge. It is certainly a critically important source of knowledge. But hardly the only source.

In applying this thinking, I take issue with Sam Harris' claim in "The Moral Landscape" that science determines moral values. No. One can know everything there is to know about a thing empirically, but that does not, in and of itself, give any values of good and evil. Indeed the very judgment and identification of good and evil precedes any scientific enquiry. Instead it is first experienced in an aspect of the person  not able to be accessed by empirical means: the conscience. Very simply, it is wrong to say that science is the source of moral values. We experience them by way of non scientific means - philosophy, literature, law etc. Science can be applied to ethics, if one believes it is possible to find out more about human nature and what makes us flourish by scientific means. But the standard of human flourishing, and that law written on our hearts precedes any scientific deliberation.

Aaron Carlin 16/1/2015

Directing the Power of Freedom

A fundamental about being human is the fact that we are free to choose our actions, and that we are morally responsible for them. Freedom, such a terrifying power…Humankind, so great and terrible, being free we can create a better world or destroy it. We can use our knowledge and ability to act to feed the hungry all over the world or start nuclear war and destroy the world and our freedom to choose altogether. We have been entrusted with a double edged sword. How do we use it well? What should we use our freedom for? It is urgent that we know how to use our freedom for good and not evil. Freedom is a dangerous thing is those that are free are evil. But that’s the price we pay of being human. Every moment of our lives we have the potential to destroy. But on the flip side we can create.

Virtue it seems is the goal. We want to become human gems. Our capacity for moral goodness and our love of it makes it logical to pursue virtue with our freedom. Not simply doing good for personal gain, but developing virtue. That is, being good with our actions and words. Our freedom should ultimately make us better people and help us to flourish as humans- eudemonia.

The total of eudemonia in the world is dependent on the collective virtue of the people living in it.  If most people are filled with vice and use their freedom selfishly and for evil, the world would become a wreck. If most people are virtuous, the world will be a better place. It seems simple: encourage virtue and thus create a good world where freedom is an ally and not a scourge. Encouraging virtue seems to be the way to “tip the odds” so to speak in our favour, to direct the outcome of human choice.

Choice…To some extent it is sort of like a gamble. We can never be entirely sure what any given person will decide…But we can tip the odds in the favour of good decisions. There are many factors that influence a person’s moral choices. Fundamentally, there is personality and the desires. These can be channeled for good or evil.  For example, a person with an angry nature could be dangerous and more likely to attack people than calm, placid people. But this anger can be used to give drive and energy in protecting the weak and working for justice. You could say we can direct a person’s personality towards good. The way one can help influence a person’s free choices towards virtue depends entirely on their personality and how they think. Not all ways work for everyone.

Knowledge and understanding is another significant factor that influences moral choices. Sometimes a person may not be malicious in desire…But they may not clearly understand why an action is morally wrong, or the consequences of their actions. If a person’s moral knowledge is insufficient, they are more likely to make immoral choices. Conversely, if a person can see clearly that an action is morally wrong they are less likely to perform the action. Thus, moral education (not coercion) is critical in helping people to direct their freedom towards the good.

Attachment to worldly pleasure can have a profound influence on a person’s moral decision making. Often, a person can know very well what is good, but are more attracted to the pleasures of the world or the flesh than doing what they know is right. For example, the carnal pleasure of taking ecstasy may tempt a person to just ignore the fact they are harming themselves and putting their children at risk just for the addictive pleasure of the drug. If these temptations are reduced, it becomes easier to do what is known to be good. Reduce attachment to worldly/carnal pleasure for its own sake, and it becomes easier for people to do good. It removes a potent distraction. Pleasure is a good thing of course. But it should be experienced in morally good ways. Pleasure should be a result of virtuous action, not sought selfishly simply for its own sake.

People find it easy to do good when they know there will be good consequences, something of a reward for their actions. Conversely, if the good action is very difficult and involves a lot of suffering and sacrifice, it can become very challenging to perform. So challenging in fact, that the immoral alternative may be chosen instead. A concrete example would be comparing giving a kidney to save a parents life and a raped woman deciding to carry the child full term. The latter would be a much more difficult decision, because of the sacrifice and suffering it entails. Fact of the matter is, many good actions involve suffering and sacrifice. We just need to make it as easy as possible for each other. When life hurts, sometimes all it takes is some solidarity and encouragement to continue bearing suffering. In the same way, to help people do what is morally right, we need to stand by each other. We need to help and encourage virtue, to partly give that little bit of worldly happiness we can’t help but desire. It’s been said that “virtue is its own reward”. But we should make it as easy as possible for us to be virtuous by encouraging virtue actively. We are all in the fight together after all.

To do good repeatedly is to eventually create habits. That is the difference between someone who simply does good and someone who is good (virtuous) as a state of being. Virtue is created when good is done all the time so it becomes effectively automatic. The thing about habits is that they are very well created when one is young. If people can be virtuous when they are young that state of being will be carried into adult life. It is far better for adults to be virtuous from the outset, because of the power they have to act. A greedy child may just eat too much. A greedy adult at the head of a company may steal from people’s wages. Teach virtue from the youngest ages, and create people who have great capacity to do good throughout life. Given this thought, education of children especially is critical to help tip the odds of decisions towards good as opposed to evil.

A good society can only be that way if its people are virtuous. To help cultivate virtue, we need to help people freely make the right decisions. Education and example are they keys, taking advantage of the good that people’s unique personalities can create. We need to make it easier for each other by encouraging each other in solidarity.  After all, goodness is often a difficult sacrifice. It may well be difficult at times, but it becomes far more difficult when people use their freedom for immoral ends. We have all been given a double edged sword. And now in the 21^st century we have unprecedented power to destroy the world we live in. But we also have more knowledge than ever before, and in many ways, more power for good. But our freedom is a dangerous thing if it is not used for good. Thus it is imperative to create good societies, and help all people to use their freedom for what it should be: moral good. Our freedom, if it is used in the right direction will create a better world. And that ultimately is what we dream of.

Aaron Carlin, 2012

Introduction

Hello readers,

I spend a lot of time reading, thinking and writing, and so I thought I would start this blog to share what I do with anyone who is interested. If you like philosophy, theology, history and even a bit of science, I will have something to offer.

The name of the blog comes from a funny nickname I got given when I studied ethics during my first year at Notre Dame. And in one way I am like Aristotle - curious about everything and wanting to think deeply and find out what's true.

Read and enjoy - don't be afraid to comment.

Aaron