Against "Abolishing Morality"

I recently read an intriguing and disturbing article "Abolishing Morality", arguing why, assuming error theory is true, why abolishing all moral thinking and discourse will be better for society, solving more problems than morality has managed to solve. I argue two main points concerning the article: first, that the author's main arguments as to the usefulness of abolishing morality are not convincing, and second that the underlying theory he is arguing for - error theory, the theory that there are no moral facts, that any moral claim is false, is fundamentally mistaken. Instead, I argue that there are indeed moral facts.

First, I want to be as fair as possible to the error theorist position. Why would anybody argue that there are no moral facts? I see two main reasons. First is the argument from naturalism. Naturalism is basically the idea that any facts should be provable by science, or else, not contradict science. Seems fair enough. According to this argument, one cannot find moral facts by looking at the world in an empirical manner - by means of observation and sense data. One can travel the world, looking around, but one will not find a moral fact. Instead, moral facts appear to be beyond the purview of scientific enquiry. GE Moore was quite right in saying that one can identify any natural property of a thing in the world one likes. But goodness is never in and of itself a part of that thing. It is always an open question as to whether that property is good. Given that moral claims of good and evil cannot be reconciled with naturalism, given they are not in and of themselves part of the empirical world, and indeed appear to be impossible to find by empirical methods, it seems that there are no moral facts. This seems like a reasonable argument, if the naturalist position is true. But I argue that naturalism is in no ways a true account of reality. It captures part of reality to be sure. But not all of it.

The above argument from naturalism assumes that all of reality is understandable and discoverable by scientific means, by empirical methods. I argue that is not the case. Before we do any science, we have to have particular beliefs on the nature of reality - in particular that it is knowable, and that the laws of logic that we use to apprehend reality actually are reliable. These things that presuppose science cannot be discovered by scientific means. Instead, they transcend empirical reality. Indeed, scientific enquiry depends on things that cannot in principle be apprehended by scientific means. One can look at a brain scan all day long, but one cannot access the inner dimensions of a thought. One can know every empirical fact about a book - its mass, its dimensions, the chemical composition of the ink. But none of these scientific facts give any information about the meaning of the words within. My point is, is that naturalism does not capture the fullness of reality. As a result, it is a mistake to look at the world solely in naturalistic terms. Indeed, this naturalism is born of the practice of reductionism in science - narrowing the scope of enquiry to that which can be apprehended by the senses and measured. The point is that reductionism which gives birth to naturalism is a narrowing of the scope. The problem with naturalism is that it makes the unwarranted assumption that this narrowed scope view of reality is all of reality. If naturalism is mistaken, then it follows that the argument from naturalism is also mistaken. Scientific claims and moral claims are of different natures, and describe different aspects of reality.

A second argument for error theory is the argument from moral controversy.It seems reasonable to suggest that if something is a fact, it should be indisputable. If there is disagreement about scientific facts, there is a clear way to check - go and do the experiment and find out. Even so, in most disciplines, the facts are normally not up for debate. There tends to be some level of stability as to what the actual facts are. Ethics, it seems, is a different thing entirely. Instead of there being consensus, there tends to be major disputes - sometimes people fighting over ethical questions. And throughout history, there has been no end in sight to these disputes. We keep doing the same things, making the same excuses, we as a species certainly have not  become moral. Indeed, there are even different ethical codes and practices in different parts of the world. One key example would be cannibalism. In places like Fiji in the past, this was seen as morally acceptable. Contrast that with the European world, and it is seen as taboo. Moral relativism being descriptively true, appears to suggest that there is no agreement over the moral facts. Indeed, this data of moral disagreement, relativism and failure to develop any sort of uniformity seems to suggest that there are no moral facts. While in science, there has been consensus on the facts, and through this consensus, progress, in ethics we are still a mess. And so, it seems logical to suggest that there are no moral facts, that error theory is true.

Although there is much truth in the above argument, I hold that it does not prove that there are no moral facts. More, that there is disagreement about these facts, and that we humans are often very bad at being moral. I observe that there are at least some moral values that are common to every culture around the world. For example, not murdering, looking after ones children, being brave, not taking what does not belong to you. Where there are exceptions to the basics, these are due to excuses, rationalisation. In the case of murder, those cultures that permitted the killing of innocent people made excuses as to why the victims were not human, or else, were permissible to kill. The basic moral fact of the value of human life remains. The reason why we even today have not come to any sort of moral consistency is that ethics is not a black and white game of logic. We are always torn between the true good for ourselves and others, and temporarily attractive goods that in the end cause harm. We are tempted. Evil is attractive. If it was not, we would not do evil. Indeed, the argument above, in pointing out moral inconsistency, in doing so supposes that there is moral reality. And the reality is, it is not a perfect world. If there were no moral facts, our pointing out to a child that hitting his brother is wrong would make no sense to him. The reason why a child is able to see the wrongness of things when it is pointed out to him is that there is a moral dimension to reality. We humans are able to see it with our consciences. I argue that there are ways of rationally figuring our the moral facts - the system of natural law is the best way, I think, of achieving the goal of ethics - human flourishing. But that is for another essay.

Having established that it is more likely that there are moral facts, rather than not, I want to address the case that abolishing morality is ultimately better for us. First argument the article presents is that, supposedly, societies that function on morality are intrinsically authoritarian, elitist, marked by economic inequality, social inequality and war. In other words, they are inextricably bound up with moral societies. Since these things are reasonably judged to be bad things, it seems to follow that the morality that underpins such societies should be abolished. There are other ways of solving our problems. This is the basic argument. And I can see why the author would make such a case. The historical example I imagine he has in mind is Christian Europe. And it is fair to say that it was marked by a level of authoritarianism and elitism. In particular, the hierarchical society, and the imposition of morality by the Church. And indeed there were, historically, large gaps between rich and poor. On one hand, there were peasants, living a hand to mouth existence, and on the other hand, the aristocracy, kings etc. , very rich. And the history of war in European history is clear. There are reasons behind such an argument. But I think that is no reason why error theory should be adopted, and that we should give up morality for the good of society.

I notice that one could argue for the above case on historical grounds. But go a bit further, and the history defeats the claim that moral societies have such qualities intrinsic to them. First, especially during the 17th and 18th centuries, European societies challenged such things as authoritarianism and elitism. Kant with his philosophy that marked the enlightenment, argued for people having moral autonomy, to think for oneself, rather than rely on the authority of the church. Concerning elitism, it is noteworthy that during the French revolution, the nobility lost their privileges, Louis XVI executed. As for economic inequality, we have political parties today working on left wing principles that try to even the odds for those poor and marginalized. And war? There are many examples of European society challenging war. The moratorium movement that arose out of the Vietnam war is a case in point. The point I want to make is this: in none of these historical cases was society amoral! This proves that such things that the author of "abolishing morality" claims are intrinsically part of moral societies are not intrinsic to them at all. As a result, morality itself is not what causes these problems. And so, abolishing morality would hardly solve these problems.

A second argument that the author of "Abolishing Morality" makes as to why hard error theory would be good for society is the claim that looking at issues as moral issues just simply causes unnecessary confusion, kindling passions, exciting the parties involved in issues at stake, preventing clear thought and compromise. Of course, this argument assumes that error theory is correct, and that there is ultimately no moral facts of the matte - and so, we should evaluate our problems apart from morality. We should look at problems as partial conflicts of interest, and evaluate moral rights in terms of legal rights, contracts etc. Although it is descriptively true that moral issues can create conflict, incite strong and fiery emotional responses, and can possibly prevent compromise, I argue again that is no reason why morality should be abolished.

Arguing in a similar vein to my last counter argument, I observe that lack of rationality and hot tempers is not as such intrinsic to discussing issues from a moral standpoint. It is perfectly possible to let the other person speak, and listen to their position. One does not have to become emotional and possibly violent when discussing issues from a moral standpoint. Indeed, an important moral principle is to love ones neighbour, which means treating them with the respect worthy of a human being. And of course, that means listening. A key problem with the above argument is that it assumes that moral principles always have an equal and opposite counter principle, and that there is no rational way to adjudicate between a moral conflict because of this. I think not. There are things that are truly good for human beings. But they exist on a hierarchy, based on how they support the flourishing of human beings. Life is the most fundamental - for without life, one cannot flourish in any way, let alone enjoy the other goods that make human life worth living. Developing a theory of hierarchy of goods, originally created by Aristotle is beyond the scope of this essay. But the point is that it can serve as a way of adjudicating between moral rights.

In conclusion, I have argued that the article "Abolishing Morality" is mistaken for the following reasons: firstly because the error theory itself appears to be mistaken. The argument from naturalism falls because naturalism as a position is untenable. It does not capture the whole of reality. The argument from moral disagreements does not hold, partly because there are still moral basics common to all cultures, and partly because we are capable of teaching people ethics. If there were no moral facts, pointing them out to young children would be nonsensical. But, instead, they are capable of seeing moral right or wrong, when it is pointed out to them. The arguments why morality should be abolished do not stand as well. The claims that moral societies are intrinsically authoritarian, elitist, economically unequal and marked by war is false historically. There are multiple examples of societies challenging such things - while remaining societies that did not do away with ethics. The other argument, the argument from emotion and confusion also is not convincing in showing why we would be better off without morality. This is because, firstly, one does not have to become an irrational bigot to discuss ethics - indeed a critical principle in many moral codes is respect for other people. And secondly, there are ways of adjudicating between parties who have moral disputes - by looking at moral rights not as equal, but part of an integrated hierarchy. Indeed, my position is that ethics can be made rational sense of, and that this hierarchy can be developed. Natural law ethics is the way forward. In future writings, I hope to show how this system can help us make sense of ethics. Of course, the question as to whether we will become good and virtuous by understanding ethics is an open one. I suspect that will not be the case. Living a moral life is hard. And we are all tempted. Knowing the truth is not even half the battle.

How Understandings of the Human Person Drastically Transforms the Search for Happiness

Note: The views of this and my other papers express my positions at that specific time. They may have changed since then.


I observe a common source underlying different interpretations of ethics. Reading the chapter on humanity in "In Defence of The Enlightenment", I noticed an important similarity between Christians and the deists of the Age of Enlightenment. The commonality is the seeking of happiness, done by love. In the same way that Aristotle posited the goal of ethics as being human flourishing, Hume, Diderot, Voltaire et al. saw the same. I am not writing as such to defend Christianity. But the goal of ethics being human happiness, identified by people as far distant as Aristotle and the enlightenment philosophers is the unifying heart of Christianity. The very meaning of God being love is the love of willing the good of the other. Although I think a loving god unlikely to exist, the idea of being holy as being a person transformed by love is a beautiful thing. Love is what gives rise to ethics, or, love is the virtue that helps us to live the two great aims - doing good and avoiding evil. This is at least clear. However, I see major differences in how this basic of ethics, this "ground" may be applied, depending on ones understanding of the human person.

Kant it appears had it right when he made it a basic principle of his moral philosophy of never treating people merely as a means to an end. A person can be a means to an end, but not merely so. One must respect their autonomy, never looking at people as things. Hence, it is for example gravely immoral for a rich man to casually pick out a person on the streets for their internal organs to be cut out to extend his life by an extra ten years. A person willingly giving their organs though is a different case, not one of mere use as a means to an end. I cannot say for certain, but it seems Kantian ethics works similarly to Christian ethics: working on the premise of the transcendent value of human beings.  What is transcendent value? It is value that goes above or transcends the way people happen to be, good or bad. It means that a person's value does not depend on what they can do, what they contribute, their race, class, gender etc. Instead, humans having transcendent value means their worth transcends all these things. Transcendent human value means people are not given ethical regard based on what they do, but from what they are, their unchanging essence. The question oas to whether we have an essence is critical for today. For the question of transcendent value of human beings changes how the basic principle of ethics as being for human flourishing is to be applied. The point of this essay is to show the horrible consequences of denying the transcendent value of human beings.

If humans have transcendent value, it follows by definition that they cannot be used as sacrificial chess pieces so to speak in the pursuit of the happiness of humanity in the abstract. If humans have transcendent value, then absolutely no individual can be treated unethically for the greater good. The value of the individual is inviolable. As a result it is, for example, under this metaphysics, it is absolutely wrong to torture people, as a person's worth is not taken away by past actions, no matter how evil. In a similar way, if humans have transcendent value, then it is wrong to to abort the unborn. If human value is not dependent on level of development, then it follows that under such an understanding of the human person, abortion is morally wrong, no matter the excuse. My position on this issue is more compassionate and nuanced than this paragraph may suggest. But it is beyond the scope of this essay to discuss the ethics of abortion at length. I simply am writing to demonstrate the effects of transcendent value of human beings has on the pursuit of human happiness. I digress. A third concrete example: if human value is sacred, unconditionally so, then it follows that it is always gravely immoral to exploit people, as formal slaves, or simply workers in sweatshops, no matter how many people are made incredibly happy by the wealth such exploitation may produce. My point is, such a view of the human person ensures the application of the principle of seeking human flourishing applies to all individual humans. Indeed, it seems to follow that if love is unconditional, such a view of the human person is the only real way to truly apply radical agape love. As I will show, when the transcendent value of humans is denied, this leaves the basic principle of love gravely damaged.

If a person's value is not transcendent, and so, is conditional, it follows that a persons value depends on things that can change. And, as a result, a person's value is never constant. Instead, under such an understanding of the human person, there can come many times when a person can be seen as no longer valuable, and so, evil can be done to the individual. I notice that a way we tend to classify people is by their instrumental worth - how much they are able to do, in other words. This can especially be seen in how we use words like deadbeat as a sneering spit on those who are very low on the social ladder. There is merit in evaluating people in terms of ability and work ethic. But, when ones moral worth depends on instrumental value, there are terrible consequences. It means, with no transcendent human value, human moral worth can justifiably be organised in a hierarchy. Those lower on the chain can be used as currency to buy the happiness of the rest of humanity, those with greater instrumental worth. Slave classes seem perfectly justifiable under such an understanding of the human person. Some have tried to classify people's moral worth based on level of sentience. This is another form of the denial of transcendent worth. And the consequence of this is that nobody is truly safe from being declared a non person, able to be used merely as an instrument for the happiness of others, rather than looked at as a loved member of the human family. Those with major mental disabilities, under such an understanding of humanity, are non persons, and so can justifiably be treated as such. Let me make it very clear that I am not defending this. Instead, I am writing to demonstrate what denial of transcendent human worth can do to the human search for happiness. When individual worth becomes dependent on changing things, then the pursuit of human happiness can simply be a question of the greatest happiness for the greatest number - at least some can be used as chess pieces to be sacrificed in the battle for happiness. Love becomes less about love of individual humans, but love of humanity in the abstract.

In writing, I hopefully have been able to show the consequences of denial of transcendent human worth has for ethics. Indeed the same goal of human flourishing takes two radical different courses depending on how one sees human beings. For true love to exist, we must see eachother as people to be loved for our own sake, rather than as things to be used, or beings whose worth can vanish in a moment of misfortune. An aspect of ethics is having the moral eyes to see moral principles. I know most of you my readers will be able to see clearly the truth of at least the principle of treating people as having transcendent worth. It is sad though that there are thinkers out there who close their hearts, and seek proof of the mind alone to confirm human transcendent worth, when ethics to some extent is a synthesis of heart and mind. But, I have faith that there is a way of proving this worth so critical for a world of real love. This will be another piece of writing.

Thoughts on Australia Day

It seems that every Australia day, I hear rather left wing writers talking about what a terrible thing Australia day is, given it in reality was the start of British colonisation in Australia, and the start of a tragic period for the Aboriginal peoples who lived on the continent for at least 40,000 years previously. My take on the issue is that yes, they indeed do have a point. We have a very sad history in that respect. But that is no reason to be sad and sour on Australia day. Part of being a member of a country is to look squarely at the past, learn from it, and so, make things better.

The location where one happens to live is, in most cases, purely accidental. We do not choose where we end up, or the people we live with. To be a patriot, with this in mind, is rather similar to being a part of a family. It is loving the country you are from, not so much because you chose it, but because you are part of it. And this love, this patriotic love, necessarily means doing what is necessary to make life better and happier for all the other people you are with in the country. And this means learning from the past, and addressing ugly issues, those that may be more comfortable just to forget. In a similar way that it is an act of love to point out to someone when they are being horrible to others so they can have the opportunity to change their behavior and become better people, I think it fair to think that it is hardly unpatriotic to have a fair sense of sadness as to the consequences of British colonisation in Australia. It does not have to be hatred of the country. But more calling all Australians to a higher moral standard - to be fair to the people that lived here for so long, to help address the injustices of the past.

What I am saying is that it is impossible to change the past. It is possible to say that "I am lucky to be Australian", but at the same time, be sad over the tragedy of how this period of Australian history began. For this sadness is the demonstration of a true patriotism, love for the people in the country you live in, the country you did not choose - to a large extent, a larger family. We are lucky to be Australians. I see Australia day as a way of celebrating being part of a larger family, the nation. The fact that the day happens to mark the start of a rather brutal occupation should be a reason to stop and think about how we can be better members of this national family - to learn from the past, and so, make Australia more a country to be admired. To love ones country is to admit the faults of the past - and to make the country better by learning those lessons. Be proud of being Australian - and remember that that pride means living as the best member one can be of the nation. We rise or fall together.

How Harris Killed His Own Case

It interests me the fact that Sam Harris in “The Moral Landscape” makes it very explicit that he is not arguing that we can base all our ethics on a purely Darwinian biological framework. If I understand him correctly, he basically stated that we have transcended this whole process of evolution and its crass “physics” of selfish genes. This strikes me as inconsistent on two basic pieces of evidence – how he attempts to follow mechanistic neuroscience down the rabbit hole to its logical conclusions of no free will, and also in the fact that he and other New Atheists consistently blast Christians for being inconsistent with the science. But, in this case, he himself makes an unwarranted leap of faith. Let me explain.

If we follow pure mechanistic science on its own terms, the idea that the universe works on laws and causality alone, and we trust the workings of Darwinistic biology, that organisms exist to keep on existing and passing on their genes to the next generations, then it appears that all ethics are simply a product of this ruling process… Ethics should evolve to fit this model, if we are indeed a part of this process. Funny thing is, Harris claims we have reached a point where we transcend the system that we are apparently locked in. It certainly appears we do. But that is beside the point. If Harris is really is so committed to following the science wherever it leads, then why does he make this assertion that we transcend the process? What evidence does he have for this? Indeed, he seems to be playing the “free miracle card”…. Doing something like that would get Christians laughed at. Talk about a double standard.

Indeed, there are good reasons to claim we have reached a point of transcending Darwinian process. To truly follow the system of ethics in terms of ethics would be antithetical to the idea of human flourishing that Harris bases his whole book on…. Namely, the idea that we should all be as happy and fulfilled as possible, and avoid the worst possible misery for everyone. This is quite common to both virtue ethics and utilitarianism. In this, he seems to be talking sense. But that’s beside the point. If we are to follow the Darwinian process and derive ethics from it, love would be very conditional. I have written on this before in another essay. We have eugenics and the forced sterilisations of Margaret Sanger to thank for applying Darwinian logic to ethics. Supposing that a consistent Darwinian ethic would be cold and savage, it appears that to solve this problem, Harris has chosen to be inconsistent. If he was consistent, his whole theory would not stand. However, it is ironic that he has not also chosen to be inconsistent with the materialism that inescapably (so it seems), destroys any notion of free will, so crucial for ethics.

I am not going to restate the argument against free will from neuroscience. I’m tired, and pretty tipsy. Let’s start from the point that if it is true, then it opens up a massive can of worms regarding ethics. How can one possibly develop prescriptions on how one is to live one’s life if it is metaphysically impossible to follow them in one way or another? Indeed, the person does not exist in this account – they are reduced to an indifferent process of chemical reactions in the brain. If one cannot really make a choice, what is the point of developing moral laws and values by the use of scientific method? And if the processes in the brain are themselves irrational, how can we even trust our thoughts on science (I am borrowing Lewis’ idea)… Our thoughts seem infinitely more likely to be mistaken, given an infinite amount of ways to be wrong, and one way to be right.  It is possible to ignore these problems, but it still makes ethics, in reality, completely pointless. Also, why do we not hold dogs, prawns, mud crabs and babies morally accountable? Because they do not have the reason to consciously choose their actions one way or another. Not only does lack of free will cut out any notion of choice from any party, rational or not, it also undercuts the reliable of rationality, if we are perfectly consistent. This creates at least as many problems for Harris than the logical conclusions of Darwinism does! It is strange that he does not take the step of evasion in this case as well. Why?

My answer to this question is, of course, a theory. I cannot know his mind. But it appears that he is desperate not to give Christianity even an inch. Christianity stresses the importance of free will… And so, Harris appears to not want to give the idea any credit… At any cost, although it seems he refuses to see the horrible cost of expunging free will has on ethics. The metaphysics is poison, as I have argued for briefly. The claim of hostility to Christianity seems quite well justified. He had written “Letter to a Christian Nation” and “The End of Faith” – both polemically atheistic books…. And in “The Moral Landscape”, he goes out of way to attack the “immorality of Christianity” (on a superficial level he had a point, but that’s for another essay)…. If he really wanted to save his case, he really should have sidestepped the free will issue! It is an odd, but perhaps explainable anomaly.

This writing does not in any way prove we have free will…. Simply that Harris has been inconsistent in his writing of “The Moral Landscape”. The issue of free will is critical, to put it lightly. I will probably spend my life trying to solve it, if it does not drive me as mad as Nietzsche in the process…

Aaron Carlin 1/12/2014

Gender is a Construct. So What?

The feminists thinkers despise the idea of gender, supposing that it is simply a "repressive social construct". But what does it mean to be a social construct? As I have reflected on it, gender being a social construct is irrelevant to its worth or grounding in reality. Indeed, most things are "socially constructed". The question to ask the concepts we are given is how well they reflect the way things are.

I see two senses of the idea of a social construct. First sense is the idea of a thing given to us by society - by such things as direct teaching, books, advertising etc. One can argue that this is a categorically bad thing as per the fashionable enlightenment ideal of knowing things for yourself, but I argue that is not the case. The enlightenment ideal is critical thinking - hardly a bad thing. But to critically think supposes knowledge. And given that our minds are to a large extent tabula rasa(blank slates) at birth, we learn not in isolation, but communally, socially. And so, it follows that most of our knowledge is socially constructed. This hardly means that all our knowledge is automatically false. We are taught proper use of our senses and reason, and so, language, to be able to think clearly about what is. The point is that all of our knowledge is initially socially constructed. Indeed, it depends on this construction for its existence. A baby untaught, unhelped by by other people, will not learn very much. We cannot exist as islands. It is only after the "social construction" of knowledge and understanding takes place that we can apply the enlightenment ideal of "knowing thyself".

This is a second sense of social construct, one which I think is closer to understanding the feminist claim that gender is simply socially constructed. As discussed before, most of our knowledge is socially constructed. It comes from various means of social input. We cannot easily learn in isolation. The first sense of social construction concerns the understanding of what is. The second sense is teleological, or goal based, concerning what ought to be. A social construct as a teleology is a recommended or demanded way of thinking or behaving which is conducive to a specific goal. In this way, social constructs in this sense is not arbitrary. They depend on the purpose that brings them into existence. Law is socially constructed in this sense. We follow it to be able to live harmoniously together in society. The value of the goals these constructs exist in service of are what are critical to always evaluate. Some examples: The social construct is the law to drive on the left side of the road in Australia. This is aligned to the telos of safety and order on the roads. This, arguably is a good goal, and so, is a reasonable social construct. Another example: the social construct is the custom of hitting every black woman one meets. The telos of this is to "punish inferiors". Are they inferior? I would argue at great lengths that of course they are not inferior. Hence, the telos is unreasonable, and so the socially constructed custom is also unreasonable. Gender behavior seems to be within this second category I have been analysing. As I have been trying to establish , social constructs are not inherently a bad thing. In the second sense of the word, they are teleological. To evaluate any socially constructed behavior , the telos that gives it form must be analysed. If it is a good telos , then the construct is at least reasonable.

In writing what I have, it means I in part agree with the feminist claims. Gender in terms of behavior is a social construct - a "second sense" social construct. It is teleological. And people can choose whether or not to conform. But, as I have been writing to establish, this does not automatically mean that traditional ideas of gender are therefore a bad thing. The purpose gender behavior serves as a social construct is what must be analysed. The feminists tend to attack the feminists tend to attack the very idea of gender, as they see it as a curtailment of freedom. To some extent this is true. But to subordinate oneself to any goal is to sacrifice some freedom. One's freedom is given to the goal in question. So, gender being a curtailment of freedom is is in this aspect an irrelevant point as to whether it has any degree of value in terms of human flourishing. But one may also object that gender is an attack on freedom , as it is a set of proscribed behaviors that one must conform to. Fair enough. Coercion is not fair. But is it coercion? People can choose one way or another. There is no law that one must be masculine or feminine. One may argue that it is, in a Millsian sense, a tyranny of the majority. But, the fact remains that one is still free to choose one way or another. And part of being a rational adult means providing sound reasons for ones behavior. One can do whatever one likes. To cry that one is a prisoner of the majority is Sartrean bad faith. In summary of this section of the essay, gender may limit freedom. But all actions towards a goal do that. The question is whether the goal is worthy enough to limit ones freedom for it, to give it as currency so to speak in a currency of freedom and action. And the idea that people are forced to act in these confines is mistaken. One is free to choose. Now the question is: is the social construct of gender good or bad? Does it have a worthy goal to give ones freedom to or not? Is it, therefore, something of societal value?

As an axiom, I observe that men and women are clearly different.  It has become fashionable to deny this. But I find it difficult to believe that one can be completely wrong  about what one sees in the people one meets everyday. That is not to say all men are all the same, and all women are completely the same. But there are aspects that set the sexes apart. There are clear biological differences, some very important ones psychological. Why do they exist? Although it is politically incorrect to point this out, these differences are ordered to the procreation of the species. We depend on each other for such a thing to happen. And we also critically depend on the continued love and relationship between our parents to be able to flourish. We do not last on our own. We humans take a long time to mature. The point is, our differences are ordered towards a particular good - the survival and flourishing of our species. Without this good being actualised, we cannot possibly enjoy any other goods. Where are we without life?

This may sound as if I am simply defining gender as as the physical differences between men and women. Not so. I am using these differences as a foundation for the goal of gender. Gender behavior itself arises from these differences. I think they are a two way process of acting out the defining features of ones gender as stamped into the body, and playing the game of attraction with the opposite sex, which makes the reason for gender in the first place actual. The behavior is the manifestation of ones sex in the world.

I will give an example. Again, this is politicall incorrect - in writing this, I am challenging an entire system. Let's take the example of strength. Men, most of the time are built physically stronger than women. It sets them apart, and so gives them a way to be attractive. I think, by and large, we respond to those differences. And so, a bloke my volunteer to take the bins out for the girls he works with, and so, maintains his honour as a potential husband. A man who whinges and whines, by contrast, will not be attractive. My point is that behavior affects the differences, differences that draw men and women together.

So there are a class of behaviors that reflect the differences between men and women. They are not as such bad things, given they are conducive to the foundations of families. Without attraction, there is no sex, and certainly no family. Sex without bonding is either an empty hook up or rape, neither good for the flourishing of human beings. However, one could object that this is all just a generalisation - and it is wrong to generalise. I think this is mistaken. Generalisation is a way of finding out about people, what they do, how they behave typically. It is finding the mean of human behaviors, to so be able to understand people better. That there are exceptions does not prove that there are no general behaviors that the sexes exhibit to play the game of attraction. Rather, that there are some people that differ a little. And that's OK. That does not diminish the purpose gender behavior has. It is, as I am arguing, healthy if not forced.

I forsee another objection. There is a problem with gender behavior, given that some of it is detrimental to the people involved. Is it really right for women to dress half naked to please men? Is it really right for men to punch eachother to a pulp in pursuit of women? This is a reasonable objection, and highlights that although gender behavior in principle is a good thing, ordered towards love, in practice it can be warped. Instead of expressing the good differences, sometimes such behavior can be perverted, either warping the differences in one way or another, or being harmful to other goods. Men, being mostly stronger than women, are attractive if they can defend their families. But fighting and brawling is a perverse exaggeration of this. It is wrong given it harms other goods such as health and social cohesion. In the example of women dressing half naked to please men, , this is a case of taking the male attraction to the female body to an extreme, in this case, encouraging lust, which is not conducive to the love that gender behavior should help promote. My point is that gender behaviors can and should be critiqued. Indeed some are not consistent with the goal of gender behaviors, but instead cause great harm. One should never do evil, even if it is socially acceptable.

One may also object on these grounds: that gender behavior is oppressive and unjust as it means people must suppress some aspects of their behavior and fit a specific model to be attractive. My response is yes, that is true. And so what? We must conform to certain specific standards all the time in order to achieve the good goals we set ourselves. As discussed, to do anything, freedom is the currency. To be a great philosopher, one must study and philosophise. Those are the conditions. To be attractive, one must play the social game, and do what it takes, within reason and without evil, to encourage attractiveness. One must conform to reality to achieve goals. It is narcissistic and futile to expect the world to change for ones desires. It is a hard reality that one must work at attraction. But it must be done. Reality will not change because one wants it to change.

In summary, it is true that gender is a social construct - but it is a rational one ordered to the good of marriage and family by helping to facilitate attraction between men and women. It can be distorted, so it is critical to critique gender behavior to ensure it is consistent with its end and the flourishing of other goods.  Not all socially acceptable actions are good. Yes, it means a certain curtailment of freedom. But all actions towards a goal mean that to some extent. And yes, the reality that gender behavior means the need for behavioral adaptation in order to facilitate attraction means one has to conform and limit ones individuality. But, we do that in achieving any goal. To seek something means to subordinate ones abilities and inclinations towards that end. Like an Olympic athlete giving themselves to their sport in order to win a medal. Gender is a social construct. But it is hardly a bad one if attraction marriage and family are a good thing. It is fair enough to choose not to live the behaviors. But it is another thing again to complain of lack of attraction when one scorns how and why people are attracted.

Aaron Carlin, January 2015.

The Partnership Between Faith and Reason

Oftentimes I have heard faith as being understood as “Believing things without a shred of evidence”, or, “throwing reason out the window”…. Fair enough, if one is a fideist, working on blind faith. With this in mind though, I contend that it is a grave mistake, indeed a caricature, to represent all faith as having this non- intellectual quality. By contrast, in Catholicism at least, faith and reason are partners. As the recent Pope Benedict XVI put it, faith and reason serve like two wings, which together take us towards truth. This essay will present the case to support this claim.

The best way to show how faith and reason are in no ways in conflict is to present some examples in everyday life which illustrate the concept, before moving on to show how Catholicism in particular does not fit into the fideist, “faith alone” bracket. One rather funny case which serves as an example was the exchange between mathematician John Lennox and biologist Richard Dawkins, when they discussed questions of faith. To paraphrase Dawkins, he stated that “You wouldn’t need to have faith if there were any evidence”. Lennox replied: “You have faith that your wife loves you Mr. Dawkins, is there any evidence for that?” The wife case – an example of faith and reason not being in conflict, but reason grounding that faith. In this case, one can see all kinds of evidence to make it seem reasonable to suggest somebody loves you – always kind to you, patient with you even on a grumpy day, the daily kiss, moving countries for you etc. But, with this in mind, one cannot know for absolute certain – as one cannot know the heart. But, with that in mind, that does not make it unreasonable to believe that the person loves you. In this way, in this example, reason is what grounds the faith. If the evidence were to suggest lack of love – not returning calls, staring into space when with you, flirting with every other person in sight, then it would be unreasonable, indeed downright folly to have any sort of faith that the other person loves. . In this way, in this example, reason is what grounds the faith.  Here is one case study. Another case will further illuminate the idea that faith and reason do not necessarily contradict each other.

Now, let us take the example of going on a voyage. Before one travels, one must have a reasonable faith that the ship will be able to make the trip without sinking. One cannot know for absolute sure that the ship won’t sink – hence there is an element of trust involved. But, reason is what grounds the faith. In this case, one assesses the evidence, to then make a judgment which has an element of faith involved…. Are there any holes in the deck? Is the engine working? Is the captain sober? Is the ship strong enough to make its way through the Northwest Passage? If the evidence seems to suggest yes, then one can put ones faith in the reliability of the ship, and so set sail. In this way, there is an element of faith involved, but it is faith anchored in reason. In this way, it is a “Trust in things not seen”, in this case, that she ship will survive the voyage. It is indeed faith. But it is by no means the throw your brain out the window, believe without evidence sort of faith that some militant atheists like to caricature faith as.  This serves as a second example of how faith and reason do not necessarily contradict.

A third and final example of faith being trust in things unseen, while supported by reason, is the case of quantum mechanics in physics. This really captures the aspect of mystery which faith can lead to – even when supported by reason. Physicists, using reason and looking carefully at experimental and mathematical evidence, came to some shocking conclusions as to the nature of matter at the atomic and sub atomic level – a strange world where matter can be waves and waves can be matter, matter can be in many places at once, and this matter-energy duality can even interfere with itself. The results of quantum mechanics are very strange and unusual, to put it very mildly. But, scientists accept quantum mechanics with faith, due to trusting the reason that they applied to even come up with this way of understanding the nature of reality on the micro scale – even if the results of this are confusing, seemingly absurd. As Richard Feynman so aptly put it “If you think you understand quantum mechanics, you don’t understand quantum mechanics”. In this way, reason underpins faith, which can take one to a level over and above reason. Not for lack of reason. But more lack of understanding for the human mind.

With part one of this short piece finished, giving life to some real examples of faith and reason working together, reason grounding faith, part two will defend the case that Catholicism at least is not in any ways blind faith. I confess, this will seem fairly weak. This is because, to really make the case for the faith in all its subtlety, answering possible objections, that would take a book in itself – probably multiple books.

What makes Catholicism different to other world religions is that it is centred not so much on a philosophy or a set of ideas, but on a person – Jesus, called The Christ. As Professor John Dixon of Maquarie University put it, Christianity bases itself on precise historical claims, claims that can be checked. For centuries, the faith has been one for scrutiny, ready for anybody to “take a swing”. The faith makes a seemingly absurd claim – that God became one of us, lived among us, died to redeem us of our sins, and to validate his claims to divinity, rose from the dead. Take Jesus out of the picture, and Christianity does not exist. St Paul put it very well, in 1 Cor 15:14, when he said “If Christ has not been raised, then our preaching is in vain, and your faith also in vain”. The faith bases itself on the life and actions of a person. Hence, the evidence to ground a reasonable faith, comes from history. I want to make a very brief summary of why I think it reasonable to put ones faith in Jesus. He claimed that he was God incarnate. The key event that I argue validates this seemingly absurd claim at first glance is that of the resurrection, and linked to that, the behaviour of the Apostles before and after the Resurrection.  If this indeed occurred, then it at least is reasonable to trust Jesus as far more than simply a wise teacher – and so this opens up a whole world of other aspects of faith, which again can be at least fairly deduced. That is where theology comes in.

Firs thing to note: Jesus indeed was dead, so the idea that the disciples just happened to think he was gloriously resurrected due to him surviving the cross just is not credible. The evidence for this can be seen in John’s Gospel, which records he being stabbed in the side, and blood and water gushing out. This, firstly, would have killed him. But the blood and water serves as secondary circumstantial evidence. Death by crucifixion is caused by asphyxiation. As this process happens, and the lungs collapse, water gathers at the bottom of the lungs. So, the blood and water described fits the medical state of affairs of a man killed by crucifixion. In short? He was indeed dead. But that alone does not in any way prove he was resurrected.

So, we have established that Jesus indeed did die on the cross. So the swoon theory is thus not credible. Some have claimed that the disciples stole the body. But, the question is of motives: why would they do that? And why would they then go around preaching that their dead master has come back to life and is Lord? A likely story…. Even so, the evidence suggests strongly against this theory. The Gospels record the Apostles as being deeply upset, fearful, indeed crushed when Jesus was killed on the cross. With this in mind, it thus seems highly unlikely that they would have any reason to possibly be preaching that Jesus was alive…. They, as any normal people would, thought him to be dead, and so, their hope had died with him.

Some have postulated that the Apostles were simply hallucinating when they claimed that Jesus rose from the dead. This is unlikely to be the case for a couple of reasons. Number one, hallucinations are private experiences. People do not have the same hallucinations, much less at the same time. Even more effective as evidence, is the way the Apostles reacted to Jesus’ death – they were crushed, deeply upset. This is not likely to be the state of someone expecting resurrection, or being in a state of wishful thinking. Indeed, when the women came to see the Apostles, shocked and amazed at the resurrection, the Apostles downplayed their words as hysteria. In short, the circumstances suggest that nobody, especially the Apostles, were expecting any sort of supernatural resurrection. Instead, as any normal person would on any normal day (or in this case, tragic set of days), they expected what is normal: the dead stay dead.

But, with this in mind, the Apostles transformed in their outlook after the resurrection… Especially after Pentecost, they became radical, inflamed with passion, unafraid of announcing the Good News – that Jesus is Lord, that he rose from the dead. St Peter, the first Pope, gave a fiery speech, preaching this very message - which ended up converting about 3000 people. There was no political or social gain to be attained by such actions. Indeed they were in time thrown out of the synagogue , and persecuted by Jews and Romans alike – Saul of Tarsus, later to be called Paul, being one example of the killers of the Christians. These people were in a position to know for sure whether or not Jesus rose from the dead. It is extremely unlikely that people would knowingly and willingly die for something they know for sure to be untrue. Hence, I think the circumstantial evidence suggests that something amazing actually did happen that Easter, approximately 2000 years ago. The best explanation of the facts is that Jesus indeed did rise from the dead, and he is who he claims he is. If this is so, then it is also reasonable to have faith in the other aspects of Christianity. If Jesus is indeed Lord, then faith in him is indeed reasonable. And that, in very short, is why I am a Christian.

This is a very short, very abridged summary of the reasons for my faith. There are much more aspects that need to be covered, much more objections. But, that will take an entire book. The purpose of this paper is to show why faith is not necessarily irrational – indeed, reason grounds faith, and then give a quick summary as to why faith is Jesus as a Christian is also supported by reason. As demonstrated, faith is by no means believing without a single shred of evidence. Rather, faith, at least in the Catholic Christian sense, is trusting where the evidence takes you, even if the results of this are out of this world and seemingly crazy at first glance. Faith, in this sense, is supported by reason. But reason alone is not enough, in the same way that faith alone is not enough. The heart and the will must take that step in trusting – and so, living the life of faith. Faith with reason – that is a motto I live by.

Aaron Carlin, October 2014

Critique of the Limits of Science

John Lennox had a point in observing that one can know every fact about the words on a page from a scientific perspective - from chemistry and physics - but this knowledge tells us nothing about the meaning of the words themselves. Indeed, meaning is non physical, transcending physical systems. This is just one of the key limits of science. In a culture that has a habit of portraying science as the only source of real knowledge, I see it as critical that the limits of science be known just as well as all of its achievements... Not to attack science, but to ensure that this field of endeavour does not go outside of its scope.

Reductionism is fair enough in the sense of trying to narrow the scope of enquiry into a thing: to be able to understand certain aspects of it while not being distracted by other aspects. Indeed the way science is done is by reducing the world to what is empirical and able to be measured, as a way of better understanding physical reality. The problem is when one takes things an unwarranted step further, claiming that just because something cannot be reduced to the purely empirical, it therefore does not exist. I can understand to some level Richard Feynman's interlocutor, asking if scientific enquiry destroys the beauty of say, flowers.  If one takes the fallacious eliminative reductionism, which attempts to claim that that the non empirical aspects of the flower do not exist - its sheer beauty and the thoughts of romance that come with it, then yes, the question seems reasonable. But if there very clearly exists reality beyond the empirical, it is unjustified to claim it does not exist, as eliminative materialism tries to do. The more realistic way to apply reductionist thinking is as a way to better understand the physical components of reality i.e the flower. This does not take away the beauty. By contrast, as Feynman appears to see at a deep level, it adds to the beauty. The reductionism of scientific enquiry is a useful way to see the physical aspects of reality more clearly. It is not a bad thing in this context. But it is folly to wear sunglasses for so long to forget the world isn't dark!

If science functions by using the thinking tool of reductionism, and it is also fair to suppose that
the aspects of reality that scientific enquiry filters out using reductionism still have a real existence, it follows that scientific enquiry, although the best thing we have for understanding the physical universe, is fundamentally limited. We can know everything about the brain chemistry of  a person. But we cannot, as such, tap into a person's consciousness. Consciousness, as one example, although linked to matter, cannot be reduced to purely matter. This is just one thing that cannot be completely captured and explained by science. Instead, we have other fields that help us attain knowledge. Aspects of thinking used in science may indeed be applied: careful reasoning, observation, developing and testing theories. But the reductionism in science cannot be applied, This is like making the very thing to be studied disappear before ones eyes. If a thing cannot be reduced to purely the empirical, it obviously cannot be studied by using a method that only looks at the empirical.

I have been pointing out some of the limits of science. In a similar way that science cannot be the only source of knowledge because as part of its method it necessarily reduces things to the empirically observable and measurable, I challenge the claim that science is the source of real knowledge, as it uses concepts and ideas that are not discovered by the scientific method. Mathematics especially is a case in point. That and the laws of logic. They cannot, as such, be discovered by empirical scientific means. To even do science, the laws of logic are taken as axioms. Science does not discover logic- instead, the very act of doing science uses and presupposes it. Quite similarly, numbers are not physical, and so able to be found by empirical means. One does not find a number by pure observation. Instead, they are more a priori concepts which can then be applied to the study of the physical world. The idea is that science itself rests on more fundamental realities, and so, cannot be the only source of real knowledge. It is certainly a critically important source of knowledge. But hardly the only source.

In applying this thinking, I take issue with Sam Harris' claim in "The Moral Landscape" that science determines moral values. No. One can know everything there is to know about a thing empirically, but that does not, in and of itself, give any values of good and evil. Indeed the very judgment and identification of good and evil precedes any scientific enquiry. Instead it is first experienced in an aspect of the person  not able to be accessed by empirical means: the conscience. Very simply, it is wrong to say that science is the source of moral values. We experience them by way of non scientific means - philosophy, literature, law etc. Science can be applied to ethics, if one believes it is possible to find out more about human nature and what makes us flourish by scientific means. But the standard of human flourishing, and that law written on our hearts precedes any scientific deliberation.

Aaron Carlin 16/1/2015