Aaronstotle's Library
Thursday, 28 January 2016
On Vice, Wounds and Getting Fat
When we have a relatively pure conscience, informed by the truth about others and ourselves, we are able to fairly accurately discern good from evil. The beautiful thing about a well formed conscience is that it works just like pain receptors on the body. When you do evil, your conscience instantly strikes you with pain and remorse. Which, if followed properly, means turning back, repenting, and righting the wrong done. This is quite analogous to dressing a wound. With a good conscience, we are able to know when we are morally hurt, and so, heal ourselves, and hopefully avoid the same errors in the future. For in the end, all moral evil has something attractive to it. But the attractiveness is simply a disguise for poison. Do evil repeatedly without repenting, and it metastases. It becomes easier and easier to do.
Maintaining a good conscience is pretty similar to exercising regularly to keep a healthy weight. When your body is in good shape, it is pretty easy to exercise. It is easy to keep everything in good order, the way it should be. But fail to look after the body, going after temporary goods, like eating a diet of fairy floss and coke, and indulging in watching absurd amounts of TV, and slowly, little by little, you get fat. And then the disaster comes: you look in the mirror, horrified at the monstrosity you've become, but the body is now very resistant to making the necessary changes. It becomes harder and harder to repent, as it were, to get things the way they should be. So it is with vice. Do one bad thing, and get into the habit of it, and in time, it becomes a second nature - truly a vice. Do evil enough without heeding the pain of the conscience, and the conscience becomes "seared" - it loses its sensitivity to evil it should have. So, the tragedy is, people in an advanced stage of vice, can reach a level where they suppress their consciences - and turning back to healing, towards goodness, becomes nearly impossible. They become as trapped as someone who has slowly gained 200kg.
The point I want to stress here is that there is hope for us all, while we are alive. The very reason the Lord became one of us is to save us from our sins, save us from turning ourselves into human disasters! We are very good at becoming human disasters, monsters of vice. So, we need a savior. However, I want to point out that we have to do our bit in being saved. When we go to a doctor, we have to listen to what he prescribes. We cannot just simply wish we were healthy and not do what it takes to become that way. We have to do our bit, resolutely, every day of our lives. It is much easier if we make it a habit of accepting grace when we are not filled with vice!
Salvation is a gift from Christ. But we need to open it up and use it. Reject it time and time again, and it becomes more difficult to take up the gift and get things back in order. Like a fat person struggling to lose weight, the soul rebels, just like the body. But, that is the price of healing. In the same way that we should encourage and help people who are struggling to lose weight and become healthy, rather than make fun of them, so we must be the same with our friends, fighting for the joy of complete salvation, complete healing. We are all on the same journey, if we choose to go on it. So let's help each other out. Don't condemn people when they fall. Encourage them, help them to take up the cross. Getting rid of vice and growing in virtue is tough! But it's how we become human gems. There are some in the world who are morbidy obese spiritually. They almost can't heal themselves on their own. They may even love the sins that are killing them. But that's why it's very important to pray for others. Not for judgment, but for mercy, healing. Because let's face it, it may well be us in the same position. Nobody is immune from making a disaster of ones life, both now and in eternity.
Tuesday, 1 December 2015
Short Words on Love, Virtue and Vice.
The real mark of human excellence is love - the willing the good of the other as other, and then doing something about it. The more we love, the more beautiful our souls become, and we become good in any situation, no matter what the conditions. Love is an act of the will, not of the feelings. Feelings of love are good, but they are not always around. Hence, it is possible to love ones enemies. Aristotle was right when he said that human excellence is created by developing the virtues. Given that real human excellence is love, then the virtues can be said to be particular modes of love. Each virtue can be said to be a colour, all the colours of the rainbow subsumed into white light.
When we fail to love, we slowly lose that which makes us beautiful. As we do evil more and more, it is easy to become blinded by vice. Sometimes the only way to be woken up is by facing the painful consequences of selfishness. Suffering shakes us out of the transformation from human to monster if we let it. Boethius in the "Consolations of Philosophy" was quite right when he said that vice turns man into an animal, and that it is a tragedy when the evil prosper. For when the evil prosper, it becomes easier for them to delude themselves into thinking they are perfectly fine, when in reality they are spiritually dying or dead.
Tuesday, 11 August 2015
On Truth, Lies, and the Culture of Lies
Truth - what is, and saying it like it is. When we speak the truth, we are aligned with reality. When we live in truth, we live in wise accordance with the way things really are. If reality is such that drinking poison causes death, then we speak the truth when we say this... And living in accordance with the truth means not drinking poison, and warning people when they are about to drink poison! "What is Truth?", Pilate said to Jesus. Truth is as simple as that.
Some philosophers have argued that truth is ultimately what coheres with everything else we know. There is an element of truth in this... At least, it tells us something about the intuitions of our hearts. We sense that when all is said and done, the universe is intelligible, everything fits together in a beautiful mosaic.
But, I think it mistaken to reduce truth to coherence. The reason why I say this is that coherence and intelligibility derives from minds capable of grasping it. Such things are not universal. A certain mathematical fact or theorem may seem incoherent and unintelligible to a novice. But that does not make it untrue. The intelligibility of the theorem, and its coherence in the rest of the matrix of theorems can only be seen by someone with more experience - an expert mathematician. In this way, coherence is not the criterion of truth.
I also argue against coherence as being the criterion of truth, given that a fact can be perfectly coherent with other facts taken to be true, but still be mistaken. Geocentricism made perfect sense to people in the middle ages, given what they could see and understand of science at the time. The proposition was coherent. But that does not mean it was therefore true. Hence, coherence is not the criterion of truth. We expect coherence, but we cannot always get it. So, coherence cannot be the ultimate guide to truth. Someone who refuses to accept a claim, well backed up with evidence, because it does not cohere with his or her web of beliefs is either delusional, proud or both.
Truth, as I have pointed out, is correspondence of thought/word with reality.... Saying things as they really are. I observe though, that there is a culture of skepticism about truth. Especially among junior philosophy students, this whole idea of "true for you, true for me" is very common. This is the dictatorship of relativism that Pope Benedict XVI spoke of. I propose a series of interrelated causes behind this state of affairs.
First, we have the phenomenon of existentialist philosophy. This was started by Friedrich Nietzsche, who in a nutshell, taught that we create reality, morality etc as artists, that life is, in a sense, art, a meaningless blank page to be scribbled on or finely painted, whatever we wish. This was carried forth by such thinkers as Jean-Paul Sartre, who argued that there is no human nature, "existence precedes essence", that there is no meaning in life except the meaning we give it. The theory of this school of thought may not be known explicitly by many people today. However, I see it in how people live their lives, interested in self-fulfillment, making their own lives, their own rules. We have become lost in radical individualism.
The existentialist philosophy, entailing radical individualism and subjectivism I observe is further played out in socio-economic changes of the 20th/21st century. Urban sprawl means we are losing the old sense of community and relationships with other people... Family sizes have dramatically shrunk , especially since the advent of the pill. It has become easier to fall into the delusion that we are islands, that we are radically free, not responsible to anybody... Shielded from the consequences of our actions, with unprecedented capability for comfort and pleasure, we live in grim cocoons. Contemporary society can be very poisonous.
I have highlighted the individualist/loneliness factor in creating the relativist culture I see. But there is another factor that is also important. As WWII drew to a fiery close with the atomic bomb, the whole confidence in human reason to create a better world was also smashed to pieces... So came the development of post modernist philosophy, skeptical of any claims to certainty, to the extent of arguing that truth itself is subjective. Reason turned against us.... So philosophically, in the academy, we have turned our backs on reason to embrace post modernism, where we see reality as only subjective opinions, all socially constructed.
Another factor in the cocoon that traps people in the matrix of relativism is how it has become easier to live in fantasy than ever before. With the advent of the computer, virtual worlds, facebook and the like, we can create our image to our hearts content, quite possibly lying to ourselves and the world until all lines between truth and lies are gone... So we deny truth itself. In a world filled with liars, truth itself becomes questionable.
When we live in a world of comfort, a world of tremendous technological power, it becomes easy to believe that our actions have no consequences, that we are God, able to create reality unconditionally. No consequences means we start to think like the Roman Emperors, or even worse, to think we are Gods. Meanwhile, the consequences of our errors show us clearly that reality does not bend to the human will - the human will must bend to reality to discover peace. A person who feels the pain of getting burnt will avoid putting his hand in a fire. A person who cannot just conveniently avoid the consequences of treating girls like mere objects to be lusted over will, hopefully, learn to have honour... Trouble is, with our increased ability to avoid the consequences of our actions, we have lost both the ability to learn, and the willingness to learn... We have the perfect society to breed unhealthy pride. The cocoon is doing its job, growing a monster. This pride will be our undoing.
Monday, 13 July 2015
About Same Sex Marriage: A Reply to Objections
A philosopher friend of mine recently sent me a series of objections and questions about my recent article about the issue of same sex marriage. In this piece of writing, I will respond to them as fairly as I can. For a short summary, see the numbered points at the end of the paper.
I have said this once, and I will say it again: I do NOT defend bullying, violence and such unjust discrimination against people with same sex attractions. No matter what ones attractions, one is a human being, worthy of respect.
But I do defend the thesis that it is not unjust to exclude those with same sex attractions from marriage. As I argued for in the original essay, marriage serves a vital purpose of protecting and supporting the unique relationship between a man and a woman that can bring forth the next generation. Marriage serves the purpose of ensuring, as much as possible, children grow up with both their mother and father. Same sex relationships are not the same as opposite sex relationships in this crucial respect, so it is dishonest to treat them as exactly the same. There are many ways to love - not all love is married love. In this essay, I will respond to the further objections.
First, my friend points out to me that "Marriage is a social, legal arrangement, not biological." I suppose that implies that if something is simply a social and legal arrangement one can justifiably change it if one wants to. It is true that it is possible to change a legal and social arrangement. But that does not mean it is a good idea.
In response to the claim that marriage is a social, legal arrangement, I reply yes, in an important sense that is correct. However, the deeper issue is why social institutions are created in the first place. Social institutions are not normally created arbitrarily, rather, ideally in the service of the common good. What I have been trying to point out is that marriage exists in the service of the common good - to ensure as far as possible, that children are raised by their natural parents, the people that should be responsible for them, being the ones that gave them life. There is a reason why such relationships are enshrined in such a manner as marriage - they are in the service of the common good. We do not enshrine friendships in such a manner because they do not have such a crucial relevance to the common good. Meanwhile, the welfare of the family, the natural family to be precise, is very much the concern of the state, if we understand the purpose of the state being to uphold the common good. Stable families create happy, virtuous people, vital given democracy requires the personal responsibility of its citizens.
In my previous essay, when I was talking about the family, I was specifically referring to the natural family - cases of adoption are making the best of a less than ideal situation. It may be charged that I am committing the naturalistic fallacy of deriving an ought from an is. I argue this is not the case. To be sure, the way things are does not automatically imply that they are the way things should be. It takes reflection on how the way things are affects human flourishing to discern whether or not something ought to be. My thesis is that family structure is important for human flourishing - children in fact do need a mother and a father. Mum is not optional. Dad is not optional. I strongly caution against this rash denial of human nature.
I talk about the distinction between possible in principle vs. possible in practice. My interlocutor objects, suggesting that I am Platonicising the relationships - that there is some universal in the "realm of forms". Not so. I am a realist - my metaphysics is that there are real universals. Humanity, family, redness are not just simply labels that one can just arbitrarily invent and change. The mind must conform with reality - reality is not ultimately created by the mind and will. However, I am not a hyper realist. Instead, my position is that universals are present in the particular things. I will, in time, write a defence of this realism.
Just to apply this abstract metaphysics, to illustrate the distinction between infertile opposite sex couples and same sex couples, I use the everyday idea of cars. The mind can grasp the universal of "car". There does not have to be a Platonic form of car. Infertile couples are like a broken car - broken or not, the car remains a car. Its essence still remains. Same sex relationships are different in kind - they can never be fertile, and so be the base for the natural family. In this way, they are like bikes. They are similar to cars, just like how same sex and opposite sex relationships are similar to each other in terms of love and affection. But they are different in kind. So it is a mistake to call them exactly the same and treat them as such.
My friend also charges me with contradicting myself by me claiming simultaneously that same sex attracted people are just as able to love as opposite sex people, and also that it is unjust for a child to be deliberately denied a mother and a father. He asks "Where does the injustice stem if both parental combinations are equally capable?
I reply that there is no contradiction. First, is perfectly possible for a person to do the things a good parent should do, but at the same time there being something ontologically not ideal with the structure of the family. The injustice, as I will reiterate, is the denial of a child his or her right to a mother and a father. Mum and dad are both important for a child's development. Men and women are different. Equal in dignity, I cannot emphasise that point enough. But different, differences important for a child to develop optimally.
Second, and even more fundamentally, the injustice is that a child is deliberately denied their heritage in being denied at least one of their natural parents. I object to the institutionalisation of such a thing, trying to claim that the not ideal is somehow equivalent to the ideal. In sum, family structure is just as important as love: children ideally need a mother and a father, their natural parents. I do not have the space to argue this point fully, Instead, I intend to write a much longer paper defending this claim. To be brief, the injustice is the denial of a child at least one of his or her natural parents, and in general, a mother and a father. No amount of love and affection justifies this being done deliberately.
In summary:
1) Marriage is a social institution and legal contract. However, I point out there is a reason why it exists, like any social institution - the ensuring a child is raised by his or her natural parents. It benefits the common good in a way that friendships and same sex relationships do not.
2) When I talked about family in my previous essay, I was referring to the natural family. Yes, an is does not automatically imply an ought. But I think it reasonable to believe that children need their mothers and fathers - mothers and fathers are not interchangeable.
3) To say that procreation in infertile heterosexual couples is possible in principle but not in practice is not to Platonicise the relationships. There are no "forms". But there are universals, just within the particulars. Damage to a thing does not change its essential nature, in the same way that a bird with its wings cut off is still a bird. It is not in the nature of same sex relationships to be able to bring forth the natural family. Meanwhile, between a man and a woman, this is in the nature of the relationship. To call something of an entirely different nature the same as the thing - be it birds, cars, relationships is a mistake.
4) The injustice when it comes to same sex marriage is not to do with parenting ability. Rather, it is the institutionalising of the deliberate denial of a child his natural parents, a mother and a father. Mothers and fathers are not optional, they have something unique to offer a child. Denying a child his or her heritage is the injustice.
Sunday, 28 June 2015
About Same Sex Marriage
Before I begin this writing, I will clearly state what I do NOT defend.
First, I do not defend or advocate for any people who make
fun of people with same sex attractions. Everybody has dignity, made in God's
likeness and image. Hence, I condemn this bigotry.
Second, I also do not defend any people who physically
attack people who have same sex attractions, or people who arbitrarily prevent
these brothers and sisters of ours getting jobs. This is gravely unjust, and I
applaud people who condemn these kinds of actions.
Third, I do not defend the view that there is somehow
something sinful about having same sex attractions per se. A person cannot be
judged on something they cannot consciously control. A person can only be
judged on their actions - it is acting out on those attractions that is the
sin. But that is not, fundamentally the point of this essay.
In sum, I advocate wholeheartedly the Catholic view of the
matter, that people with same sex attractions should be treated with
sensitivity and respect, and unjust discrimination should be avoided.
The words today about same sex marriage is that it is the
seeking of "Equality". However, as I will argue, it is only fair to
treat equal, "same" things equally. The thing is, same sex
relationships, as I will point out, do not have the relevant sameness to
opposite sex relationships to participate in the relationship of marriage. This
is a just discrimination, given that the relationships, being fundamentally
different cannot be called the same thing and treated the same. In this
writing, I will show what the important difference is.
First thing to note is that every single one of us comes
from the union of a man and a woman. Every child needs and mother and a father.
This basic anthropological fact explains why marriage exists, it is, at its
deepest level, about being a foundation for the family. The family is in
principle, if not in practice, possible in the relationship between a man and a
woman. However, this love is subordinate to the higher purpose of being the
foundation for the family, and so, every human life.
If we accept the premises that we all come from the union
between a man and a woman, and that is is very important that a child has both
of his or her parents, than it follows that the relationship that ties children
to their natural parents be protected. This is ultimately what marriage is all
about - it is deeper than just love between two people. Instead, the love is
for the core of the family, and so the core of society. The reason why marriage
exists is to enshrine this vital relationship.
I foresee some objections. Firstly, one may say "You
say that marriage has the purpose of procreation and family. But what about
infertile couples? Their unions are sterile. If this is so, why can't gays
marry, given their relationships are also sterile?"
In response, I draw the distinction between something being
possible in principle and possible in practice. Something being possible in
principle means being possible in relation to the definition of the thing.
Opposite sex relationships, by definition, male and female, have the possibility
in principle of procreation and so, the natural family. The fact that there are
some that do not live this out in practice - like infertile couples - does not
change the fact that procreation is still possible in principle in these
relationships. Between two men or two women, by contrast, the natural family
cannot even in principle occur. Same sex relationships have no possibility
whatsoever of natural procreation. So, they also cannot, even in principle,
cannot take part in the relationship that is supposed to protect the natural
family. Infertile couples, by contrast, at least have the procreative ability
in principle, just sadly not in practice.
Second objection is to point out that people with same sex
attractions are just as good parents as people who are heterosexual. One could
possibly infer therefore, that gender is not relevant in the raising of
children, and so same sex marriage is therefore licit.
I reply that yes, people with same sex attractions are just
as able to love as those who have opposite sex attractions. But love in terms
of affection is not the only thing that is important in a child's development.
Instead, if love is willing the good of the other person, then it is reasonable
to say that real love would not deny a child one of his or her parents. Single
parent cases or adoption cases are making the best of a bad situation - there
is no intent of a child losing any relationship with either of his or her
parents in most of these situations. However, in the case of same sex
relationships, a child is deliberately denied a mother or a father. This is
unjust - an injustice that no amount of well-meaning love and affection can
fix.
In writing what I have, I am protecting marriage. Again, I
reiterate my points made at the start of my essay - all unjust discrimination
should be avoided - attacking, making fun of and the like. ALL people have
inherent dignity. I am simply pointing out that we discriminate when there are
relevant differences. We treat different things differently. As I have pointed
out, same sex relationships and opposite sex relationships are inherently
different, one having within itself the possibility of the natural family, the
other never having this possibility. So, it is an injustice, indeed dishonest
to call them equal and the same when they are not
Friday, 13 February 2015
Against "Abolishing Morality"
I recently read an intriguing and disturbing article "Abolishing Morality", arguing why, assuming error theory is true, why abolishing all moral thinking and discourse will be better for society, solving more problems than morality has managed to solve. I argue two main points concerning the article: first, that the author's main arguments as to the usefulness of abolishing morality are not convincing, and second that the underlying theory he is arguing for - error theory, the theory that there are no moral facts, that any moral claim is false, is fundamentally mistaken. Instead, I argue that there are indeed moral facts.
First, I want to be as fair as possible to the error theorist position. Why would anybody argue that there are no moral facts? I see two main reasons. First is the argument from naturalism. Naturalism is basically the idea that any facts should be provable by science, or else, not contradict science. Seems fair enough. According to this argument, one cannot find moral facts by looking at the world in an empirical manner - by means of observation and sense data. One can travel the world, looking around, but one will not find a moral fact. Instead, moral facts appear to be beyond the purview of scientific enquiry. GE Moore was quite right in saying that one can identify any natural property of a thing in the world one likes. But goodness is never in and of itself a part of that thing. It is always an open question as to whether that property is good. Given that moral claims of good and evil cannot be reconciled with naturalism, given they are not in and of themselves part of the empirical world, and indeed appear to be impossible to find by empirical methods, it seems that there are no moral facts. This seems like a reasonable argument, if the naturalist position is true. But I argue that naturalism is in no ways a true account of reality. It captures part of reality to be sure. But not all of it.
The above argument from naturalism assumes that all of reality is understandable and discoverable by scientific means, by empirical methods. I argue that is not the case. Before we do any science, we have to have particular beliefs on the nature of reality - in particular that it is knowable, and that the laws of logic that we use to apprehend reality actually are reliable. These things that presuppose science cannot be discovered by scientific means. Instead, they transcend empirical reality. Indeed, scientific enquiry depends on things that cannot in principle be apprehended by scientific means. One can look at a brain scan all day long, but one cannot access the inner dimensions of a thought. One can know every empirical fact about a book - its mass, its dimensions, the chemical composition of the ink. But none of these scientific facts give any information about the meaning of the words within. My point is, is that naturalism does not capture the fullness of reality. As a result, it is a mistake to look at the world solely in naturalistic terms. Indeed, this naturalism is born of the practice of reductionism in science - narrowing the scope of enquiry to that which can be apprehended by the senses and measured. The point is that reductionism which gives birth to naturalism is a narrowing of the scope. The problem with naturalism is that it makes the unwarranted assumption that this narrowed scope view of reality is all of reality. If naturalism is mistaken, then it follows that the argument from naturalism is also mistaken. Scientific claims and moral claims are of different natures, and describe different aspects of reality.
A second argument for error theory is the argument from moral controversy.It seems reasonable to suggest that if something is a fact, it should be indisputable. If there is disagreement about scientific facts, there is a clear way to check - go and do the experiment and find out. Even so, in most disciplines, the facts are normally not up for debate. There tends to be some level of stability as to what the actual facts are. Ethics, it seems, is a different thing entirely. Instead of there being consensus, there tends to be major disputes - sometimes people fighting over ethical questions. And throughout history, there has been no end in sight to these disputes. We keep doing the same things, making the same excuses, we as a species certainly have not become moral. Indeed, there are even different ethical codes and practices in different parts of the world. One key example would be cannibalism. In places like Fiji in the past, this was seen as morally acceptable. Contrast that with the European world, and it is seen as taboo. Moral relativism being descriptively true, appears to suggest that there is no agreement over the moral facts. Indeed, this data of moral disagreement, relativism and failure to develop any sort of uniformity seems to suggest that there are no moral facts. While in science, there has been consensus on the facts, and through this consensus, progress, in ethics we are still a mess. And so, it seems logical to suggest that there are no moral facts, that error theory is true.
Although there is much truth in the above argument, I hold that it does not prove that there are no moral facts. More, that there is disagreement about these facts, and that we humans are often very bad at being moral. I observe that there are at least some moral values that are common to every culture around the world. For example, not murdering, looking after ones children, being brave, not taking what does not belong to you. Where there are exceptions to the basics, these are due to excuses, rationalisation. In the case of murder, those cultures that permitted the killing of innocent people made excuses as to why the victims were not human, or else, were permissible to kill. The basic moral fact of the value of human life remains. The reason why we even today have not come to any sort of moral consistency is that ethics is not a black and white game of logic. We are always torn between the true good for ourselves and others, and temporarily attractive goods that in the end cause harm. We are tempted. Evil is attractive. If it was not, we would not do evil. Indeed, the argument above, in pointing out moral inconsistency, in doing so supposes that there is moral reality. And the reality is, it is not a perfect world. If there were no moral facts, our pointing out to a child that hitting his brother is wrong would make no sense to him. The reason why a child is able to see the wrongness of things when it is pointed out to him is that there is a moral dimension to reality. We humans are able to see it with our consciences. I argue that there are ways of rationally figuring our the moral facts - the system of natural law is the best way, I think, of achieving the goal of ethics - human flourishing. But that is for another essay.
Having established that it is more likely that there are moral facts, rather than not, I want to address the case that abolishing morality is ultimately better for us. First argument the article presents is that, supposedly, societies that function on morality are intrinsically authoritarian, elitist, marked by economic inequality, social inequality and war. In other words, they are inextricably bound up with moral societies. Since these things are reasonably judged to be bad things, it seems to follow that the morality that underpins such societies should be abolished. There are other ways of solving our problems. This is the basic argument. And I can see why the author would make such a case. The historical example I imagine he has in mind is Christian Europe. And it is fair to say that it was marked by a level of authoritarianism and elitism. In particular, the hierarchical society, and the imposition of morality by the Church. And indeed there were, historically, large gaps between rich and poor. On one hand, there were peasants, living a hand to mouth existence, and on the other hand, the aristocracy, kings etc. , very rich. And the history of war in European history is clear. There are reasons behind such an argument. But I think that is no reason why error theory should be adopted, and that we should give up morality for the good of society.
I notice that one could argue for the above case on historical grounds. But go a bit further, and the history defeats the claim that moral societies have such qualities intrinsic to them. First, especially during the 17th and 18th centuries, European societies challenged such things as authoritarianism and elitism. Kant with his philosophy that marked the enlightenment, argued for people having moral autonomy, to think for oneself, rather than rely on the authority of the church. Concerning elitism, it is noteworthy that during the French revolution, the nobility lost their privileges, Louis XVI executed. As for economic inequality, we have political parties today working on left wing principles that try to even the odds for those poor and marginalized. And war? There are many examples of European society challenging war. The moratorium movement that arose out of the Vietnam war is a case in point. The point I want to make is this: in none of these historical cases was society amoral! This proves that such things that the author of "abolishing morality" claims are intrinsically part of moral societies are not intrinsic to them at all. As a result, morality itself is not what causes these problems. And so, abolishing morality would hardly solve these problems.
A second argument that the author of "Abolishing Morality" makes as to why hard error theory would be good for society is the claim that looking at issues as moral issues just simply causes unnecessary confusion, kindling passions, exciting the parties involved in issues at stake, preventing clear thought and compromise. Of course, this argument assumes that error theory is correct, and that there is ultimately no moral facts of the matte - and so, we should evaluate our problems apart from morality. We should look at problems as partial conflicts of interest, and evaluate moral rights in terms of legal rights, contracts etc. Although it is descriptively true that moral issues can create conflict, incite strong and fiery emotional responses, and can possibly prevent compromise, I argue again that is no reason why morality should be abolished.
Arguing in a similar vein to my last counter argument, I observe that lack of rationality and hot tempers is not as such intrinsic to discussing issues from a moral standpoint. It is perfectly possible to let the other person speak, and listen to their position. One does not have to become emotional and possibly violent when discussing issues from a moral standpoint. Indeed, an important moral principle is to love ones neighbour, which means treating them with the respect worthy of a human being. And of course, that means listening. A key problem with the above argument is that it assumes that moral principles always have an equal and opposite counter principle, and that there is no rational way to adjudicate between a moral conflict because of this. I think not. There are things that are truly good for human beings. But they exist on a hierarchy, based on how they support the flourishing of human beings. Life is the most fundamental - for without life, one cannot flourish in any way, let alone enjoy the other goods that make human life worth living. Developing a theory of hierarchy of goods, originally created by Aristotle is beyond the scope of this essay. But the point is that it can serve as a way of adjudicating between moral rights.
In conclusion, I have argued that the article "Abolishing Morality" is mistaken for the following reasons: firstly because the error theory itself appears to be mistaken. The argument from naturalism falls because naturalism as a position is untenable. It does not capture the whole of reality. The argument from moral disagreements does not hold, partly because there are still moral basics common to all cultures, and partly because we are capable of teaching people ethics. If there were no moral facts, pointing them out to young children would be nonsensical. But, instead, they are capable of seeing moral right or wrong, when it is pointed out to them. The arguments why morality should be abolished do not stand as well. The claims that moral societies are intrinsically authoritarian, elitist, economically unequal and marked by war is false historically. There are multiple examples of societies challenging such things - while remaining societies that did not do away with ethics. The other argument, the argument from emotion and confusion also is not convincing in showing why we would be better off without morality. This is because, firstly, one does not have to become an irrational bigot to discuss ethics - indeed a critical principle in many moral codes is respect for other people. And secondly, there are ways of adjudicating between parties who have moral disputes - by looking at moral rights not as equal, but part of an integrated hierarchy. Indeed, my position is that ethics can be made rational sense of, and that this hierarchy can be developed. Natural law ethics is the way forward. In future writings, I hope to show how this system can help us make sense of ethics. Of course, the question as to whether we will become good and virtuous by understanding ethics is an open one. I suspect that will not be the case. Living a moral life is hard. And we are all tempted. Knowing the truth is not even half the battle.
Tuesday, 10 February 2015
How Understandings of the Human Person Drastically Transforms the Search for Happiness
Note: The views of this and my other papers express my positions at that specific time. They may have changed since then.
I observe a common source underlying different interpretations of ethics. Reading the chapter on humanity in "In Defence of The Enlightenment", I noticed an important similarity between Christians and the deists of the Age of Enlightenment. The commonality is the seeking of happiness, done by love. In the same way that Aristotle posited the goal of ethics as being human flourishing, Hume, Diderot, Voltaire et al. saw the same. I am not writing as such to defend Christianity. But the goal of ethics being human happiness, identified by people as far distant as Aristotle and the enlightenment philosophers is the unifying heart of Christianity. The very meaning of God being love is the love of willing the good of the other. Although I think a loving god unlikely to exist, the idea of being holy as being a person transformed by love is a beautiful thing. Love is what gives rise to ethics, or, love is the virtue that helps us to live the two great aims - doing good and avoiding evil. This is at least clear. However, I see major differences in how this basic of ethics, this "ground" may be applied, depending on ones understanding of the human person.
Kant it appears had it right when he made it a basic principle of his moral philosophy of never treating people merely as a means to an end. A person can be a means to an end, but not merely so. One must respect their autonomy, never looking at people as things. Hence, it is for example gravely immoral for a rich man to casually pick out a person on the streets for their internal organs to be cut out to extend his life by an extra ten years. A person willingly giving their organs though is a different case, not one of mere use as a means to an end. I cannot say for certain, but it seems Kantian ethics works similarly to Christian ethics: working on the premise of the transcendent value of human beings. What is transcendent value? It is value that goes above or transcends the way people happen to be, good or bad. It means that a person's value does not depend on what they can do, what they contribute, their race, class, gender etc. Instead, humans having transcendent value means their worth transcends all these things. Transcendent human value means people are not given ethical regard based on what they do, but from what they are, their unchanging essence. The question oas to whether we have an essence is critical for today. For the question of transcendent value of human beings changes how the basic principle of ethics as being for human flourishing is to be applied. The point of this essay is to show the horrible consequences of denying the transcendent value of human beings.
If humans have transcendent value, it follows by definition that they cannot be used as sacrificial chess pieces so to speak in the pursuit of the happiness of humanity in the abstract. If humans have transcendent value, then absolutely no individual can be treated unethically for the greater good. The value of the individual is inviolable. As a result it is, for example, under this metaphysics, it is absolutely wrong to torture people, as a person's worth is not taken away by past actions, no matter how evil. In a similar way, if humans have transcendent value, then it is wrong to to abort the unborn. If human value is not dependent on level of development, then it follows that under such an understanding of the human person, abortion is morally wrong, no matter the excuse. My position on this issue is more compassionate and nuanced than this paragraph may suggest. But it is beyond the scope of this essay to discuss the ethics of abortion at length. I simply am writing to demonstrate the effects of transcendent value of human beings has on the pursuit of human happiness. I digress. A third concrete example: if human value is sacred, unconditionally so, then it follows that it is always gravely immoral to exploit people, as formal slaves, or simply workers in sweatshops, no matter how many people are made incredibly happy by the wealth such exploitation may produce. My point is, such a view of the human person ensures the application of the principle of seeking human flourishing applies to all individual humans. Indeed, it seems to follow that if love is unconditional, such a view of the human person is the only real way to truly apply radical agape love. As I will show, when the transcendent value of humans is denied, this leaves the basic principle of love gravely damaged.
If a person's value is not transcendent, and so, is conditional, it follows that a persons value depends on things that can change. And, as a result, a person's value is never constant. Instead, under such an understanding of the human person, there can come many times when a person can be seen as no longer valuable, and so, evil can be done to the individual. I notice that a way we tend to classify people is by their instrumental worth - how much they are able to do, in other words. This can especially be seen in how we use words like deadbeat as a sneering spit on those who are very low on the social ladder. There is merit in evaluating people in terms of ability and work ethic. But, when ones moral worth depends on instrumental value, there are terrible consequences. It means, with no transcendent human value, human moral worth can justifiably be organised in a hierarchy. Those lower on the chain can be used as currency to buy the happiness of the rest of humanity, those with greater instrumental worth. Slave classes seem perfectly justifiable under such an understanding of the human person. Some have tried to classify people's moral worth based on level of sentience. This is another form of the denial of transcendent worth. And the consequence of this is that nobody is truly safe from being declared a non person, able to be used merely as an instrument for the happiness of others, rather than looked at as a loved member of the human family. Those with major mental disabilities, under such an understanding of humanity, are non persons, and so can justifiably be treated as such. Let me make it very clear that I am not defending this. Instead, I am writing to demonstrate what denial of transcendent human worth can do to the human search for happiness. When individual worth becomes dependent on changing things, then the pursuit of human happiness can simply be a question of the greatest happiness for the greatest number - at least some can be used as chess pieces to be sacrificed in the battle for happiness. Love becomes less about love of individual humans, but love of humanity in the abstract.
In writing, I hopefully have been able to show the consequences of denial of transcendent human worth has for ethics. Indeed the same goal of human flourishing takes two radical different courses depending on how one sees human beings. For true love to exist, we must see eachother as people to be loved for our own sake, rather than as things to be used, or beings whose worth can vanish in a moment of misfortune. An aspect of ethics is having the moral eyes to see moral principles. I know most of you my readers will be able to see clearly the truth of at least the principle of treating people as having transcendent worth. It is sad though that there are thinkers out there who close their hearts, and seek proof of the mind alone to confirm human transcendent worth, when ethics to some extent is a synthesis of heart and mind. But, I have faith that there is a way of proving this worth so critical for a world of real love. This will be another piece of writing.
I observe a common source underlying different interpretations of ethics. Reading the chapter on humanity in "In Defence of The Enlightenment", I noticed an important similarity between Christians and the deists of the Age of Enlightenment. The commonality is the seeking of happiness, done by love. In the same way that Aristotle posited the goal of ethics as being human flourishing, Hume, Diderot, Voltaire et al. saw the same. I am not writing as such to defend Christianity. But the goal of ethics being human happiness, identified by people as far distant as Aristotle and the enlightenment philosophers is the unifying heart of Christianity. The very meaning of God being love is the love of willing the good of the other. Although I think a loving god unlikely to exist, the idea of being holy as being a person transformed by love is a beautiful thing. Love is what gives rise to ethics, or, love is the virtue that helps us to live the two great aims - doing good and avoiding evil. This is at least clear. However, I see major differences in how this basic of ethics, this "ground" may be applied, depending on ones understanding of the human person.
Kant it appears had it right when he made it a basic principle of his moral philosophy of never treating people merely as a means to an end. A person can be a means to an end, but not merely so. One must respect their autonomy, never looking at people as things. Hence, it is for example gravely immoral for a rich man to casually pick out a person on the streets for their internal organs to be cut out to extend his life by an extra ten years. A person willingly giving their organs though is a different case, not one of mere use as a means to an end. I cannot say for certain, but it seems Kantian ethics works similarly to Christian ethics: working on the premise of the transcendent value of human beings. What is transcendent value? It is value that goes above or transcends the way people happen to be, good or bad. It means that a person's value does not depend on what they can do, what they contribute, their race, class, gender etc. Instead, humans having transcendent value means their worth transcends all these things. Transcendent human value means people are not given ethical regard based on what they do, but from what they are, their unchanging essence. The question oas to whether we have an essence is critical for today. For the question of transcendent value of human beings changes how the basic principle of ethics as being for human flourishing is to be applied. The point of this essay is to show the horrible consequences of denying the transcendent value of human beings.
If humans have transcendent value, it follows by definition that they cannot be used as sacrificial chess pieces so to speak in the pursuit of the happiness of humanity in the abstract. If humans have transcendent value, then absolutely no individual can be treated unethically for the greater good. The value of the individual is inviolable. As a result it is, for example, under this metaphysics, it is absolutely wrong to torture people, as a person's worth is not taken away by past actions, no matter how evil. In a similar way, if humans have transcendent value, then it is wrong to to abort the unborn. If human value is not dependent on level of development, then it follows that under such an understanding of the human person, abortion is morally wrong, no matter the excuse. My position on this issue is more compassionate and nuanced than this paragraph may suggest. But it is beyond the scope of this essay to discuss the ethics of abortion at length. I simply am writing to demonstrate the effects of transcendent value of human beings has on the pursuit of human happiness. I digress. A third concrete example: if human value is sacred, unconditionally so, then it follows that it is always gravely immoral to exploit people, as formal slaves, or simply workers in sweatshops, no matter how many people are made incredibly happy by the wealth such exploitation may produce. My point is, such a view of the human person ensures the application of the principle of seeking human flourishing applies to all individual humans. Indeed, it seems to follow that if love is unconditional, such a view of the human person is the only real way to truly apply radical agape love. As I will show, when the transcendent value of humans is denied, this leaves the basic principle of love gravely damaged.
If a person's value is not transcendent, and so, is conditional, it follows that a persons value depends on things that can change. And, as a result, a person's value is never constant. Instead, under such an understanding of the human person, there can come many times when a person can be seen as no longer valuable, and so, evil can be done to the individual. I notice that a way we tend to classify people is by their instrumental worth - how much they are able to do, in other words. This can especially be seen in how we use words like deadbeat as a sneering spit on those who are very low on the social ladder. There is merit in evaluating people in terms of ability and work ethic. But, when ones moral worth depends on instrumental value, there are terrible consequences. It means, with no transcendent human value, human moral worth can justifiably be organised in a hierarchy. Those lower on the chain can be used as currency to buy the happiness of the rest of humanity, those with greater instrumental worth. Slave classes seem perfectly justifiable under such an understanding of the human person. Some have tried to classify people's moral worth based on level of sentience. This is another form of the denial of transcendent worth. And the consequence of this is that nobody is truly safe from being declared a non person, able to be used merely as an instrument for the happiness of others, rather than looked at as a loved member of the human family. Those with major mental disabilities, under such an understanding of humanity, are non persons, and so can justifiably be treated as such. Let me make it very clear that I am not defending this. Instead, I am writing to demonstrate what denial of transcendent human worth can do to the human search for happiness. When individual worth becomes dependent on changing things, then the pursuit of human happiness can simply be a question of the greatest happiness for the greatest number - at least some can be used as chess pieces to be sacrificed in the battle for happiness. Love becomes less about love of individual humans, but love of humanity in the abstract.
In writing, I hopefully have been able to show the consequences of denial of transcendent human worth has for ethics. Indeed the same goal of human flourishing takes two radical different courses depending on how one sees human beings. For true love to exist, we must see eachother as people to be loved for our own sake, rather than as things to be used, or beings whose worth can vanish in a moment of misfortune. An aspect of ethics is having the moral eyes to see moral principles. I know most of you my readers will be able to see clearly the truth of at least the principle of treating people as having transcendent worth. It is sad though that there are thinkers out there who close their hearts, and seek proof of the mind alone to confirm human transcendent worth, when ethics to some extent is a synthesis of heart and mind. But, I have faith that there is a way of proving this worth so critical for a world of real love. This will be another piece of writing.
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